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The First Amendment to the federal Constitution
guarantees persons the right to petition the government for
redress of grievances.1 Although the Petition Clause was
virtually ignored for decades, it has garnered considerably more
attention in the past several years. Most legal observers now
agree that the First Amendment guarantees some form of access
to court and that the right does not extend to baseless suits. An
emerging issue is the standard for defining the civil suits that
are within First Amendment protection: Does the Petition Clause
protect only winning claims, or does it also protect losing but
objectively reasonable suits? The U.S. Supreme Court has fueled
debate on this issue by seemingly endorsing both standards of
merit. In June 2002, in BE & K Construction Co. v. NLRB,2 the
Court again considered the question of the proper merit standard
under the First Amendment, but, ultimately, it avoided what it
called a "difficult constitutional question" by deciding the case on
statutory grounds.3 In this Article, I examine the debate
concerning meritorious suits and the impact of BE & K, and,
more importantly, I propose a solution to this difficult
constitutional question.
In Part I of this Article, I give the background of the issue. I
start with an overview of the modern recognition of the right of
court access under the Petition Clause. I then review the debate
concerning the proper test for determining whether a civil suit
falls within the protection of the First Amendment. I examine in
detail the Court's two prior decisions-Bill Johnson's
Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB 4 and Professional Real Estate
Investors, Inc. v. Columbia PicturesIndustries, Inc. 5 -in which it
set seemingly conflicting standards. Bill Johnson's suggested a
win-lose test, while Professional Real Estate Investors set an
objective merit standard.6 I conclude this review by reporting how
lower courts have responded. For the most part, courts have
followed the more protective Professional Real Estate Investors

1.

The Petition Clause is the last protection of the First Amendment:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.
U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
2.
122 S. Ct. 2390 (2002).
3.
Id. at 2399, 2401-02.
4.
461 U.S. 731 (1983).
5.
508 U.S. 49 (1993).
6.
Refer to Part I.B infra.
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objective standard, but some have chosen to apply the narrower
Bill Johnson's win-lose test.
In Part II, I examine the BE & K case and its implications
for solving this conflict. I give the background of the case and
then explore in detail the Court's opinions in BE & K-the
majority opinion of Justice O'Connor and the two concurring
opinions of Justice Scalia and Justice Breyer. The exact impact of
the case is somewhat difficult to decipher. Although the Court
explored the question of what suits are within the protection of
the First Amendment, the Court reserved decision on this issue
and instead decided the case by narrowly construing the National
Labor Relations Act. The constitutional standard is thus open to
debate, although the Court did give some suggestions as to how
in the future it might approach the question of merit under the
Petition Clause.
In Part III, I offer my solution. I argue that the Court
should adopt a narrow standard for defining the suits that fall
within the core right of the Petition Clause-whether a case
wins or loses in court-but that the Court should protect this
narrow right by applying "breathing room" analysis and
extending constitutional protection to many losing but
meritorious suits. I have advocated this breathing room
framework before, in a prior series of articles examining the
right to petition courts.7 The Court in BE & K cited the first of
these articles in discussing whether the First Amendment
protected losing but meritorious lawsuits.' Here, I refine my
7.
In my first article, I generally examined the right to petition courts, including
whether such a right could properly be founded on the First Amendment. See Carol Rice
Andrews, A Right of Access to Court Under the Petition Clause of the FirstAmendment:
Defining the Right, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 557 (1999) [hereinafter Andrews, Access to Court]. I
concluded that the First Amendment includes a right of court access but that the core
right is limited in many respects. Among other things, I argued that the core right to
petition courts applies only to winning claims, but that the ability to file lawsuits is
further protected by breathing room analysis, similar to that which the Court applies to
defamatory speech in the New York Times line of cases. In two additional articles, I
applied my proposed analytical framework to a variety of statutes and court rules that
purport to limit access to court based on the motive of the plaintiff. See Carol Rice
Andrews, Motive Restrictions on Court Access: A FirstAmendment Challenge, 61 OHIO ST.
L.J. 665 (2000) [hereinafter Andrews, Motive Restrictions] (assessing a wide array of laws
ranging from court rules to civil rights statutes); Carol Rice Andrews, The First
Amendment Problem with the Motive Restrictions in the Rules of ProfessionalConduct, 24
J. LEGAL PROF. 13 (2000) [hereinafter Andrews, Rules of Professional Conduct] (focusing
on motive restrictions in the rules of professional conduct for lawyers). In the fourth
article, I focused my analysis on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)(1) and its potential
interaction with the Petition Clause in Paula Jones's case against former President
Clinton. See Carol Rice Andrews, Jones v. Clinton: A Study in PoliticallyMotivated Suits,
Rule 11, and the FirstAmendment, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1 [hereinafter Andrews, Politically
Motivated Suits].
8.
BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 122 S. Ct. 2390, 2400 (2002) (quoting Andrews,
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proposal and examine it in light of the BE & K decision. I
conclude that my proposed framework is consistent with the
Court's discussion in BE & K, including the separate
concurring opinions. More importantly, a narrow definition of
the right of court access, accompanied by breathing room
analysis, is the best way to achieve a proper balance between
protecting a plaintiffs First Amendment freedom of court
access and preventing substantive abuses of our court system.
I.

THE "MERIT" DEBATE UNDER THE FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO PETITION COURTS

Most people are unfamiliar with the last clause of the
First Amendment, which protects a citizen's right to petition
the government for redress of grievances. Yet the right is
essential to "[t]he very idea of a government, republican in
form."9 Like most other First Amendment freedoms, the right
to petition is not absolute. In the context of petitions to the
legislative or executive branches of government, the Supreme
Court has held that the right does not include a duty of
response by those branches ° and does not include the right to
file sham" or maliciously false petitions. 2 The right to petition
the judicial branch also is limited, but the contours of that
limitation are ill-defined. As courts and commentators
increasingly recognize a right to petition courts, they also must
struggle to define the extent of that right. One issue is
whether the Petition Clause protects a person's right to file
something other than a winning suit. Although many courts,
following the Supreme Court's decision in Professional Real
Estate Investors, hold that the Petition Clause right of court
access includes losing but colorable claims, others follow the
Court's earlier decision in Bill Johnson's and hold that the core
right extends only to civil actions that ultimately prevail.

Access to Court, supra note 7, at 656).

9. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875).
10. Minn. State Bd. of Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 282, 285 (1984)
("Nothing in the First Amendment or in this Court's case law interpreting it suggest that
the rights to speak, associate, and petition require government policymakers to listen or
respond to individuals' communications on public issues.").
11.
E.g., E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127
(1961). Refer to notes 38-44, 61-62 infra and accompanying text (discussing the Noerr
sham doctrine).
12. See McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 484 (1985). Refer to notes 54-56, 60 infra
and accompanying text (discussing McDonald).
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A. Recognition of the FirstAmendment Right to Petition Courts
Despite the general lack of familiarity with the right to
petition, petitions to the government are a fixture in AngloAmerican law. 3 In 1215, the right to petition was one of the
concessions that King John extended to the English barons in the
Magna Carta." Petitioning became a common means by which
English subjects communicated with the King and early
Parliament. 5 The English Bill of Rights, in 1689, included the
"right of ... subjects to petition the king" and mandated "that,
for redress of all grievances ... parliaments ought to be held
frequently."16 Colonists continued the practice in America.
Americans preserved the right to petition both in their colonial
charters 7 and in their early state constitutions. 8
The common conception of a petition today is one to the
executive or legislative branch, and many historical statements
of the petition right spoke only of such petitions. 9 Nevertheless,
citizen petitions historically included requests for private relief,

13.
For a more detailed discussion of the history of the right to petition and its
application to private judicial petitions, see Andrews, Access to Court, supra note 7, at
595-625.
14.
MAGNA CARTA, ch. 61 (1215), translated and reprinted in J.C. HOLT, MAGNA
CARTA 333-35 (1965) ("[I]f we or... any of our servants offend against anyone in any
way... four barons shall come to us or our justiciar, if we are out of the kingdom, and
shall bring it to our notice and ask that we will have it redressed without delay.").
15.
See Julie M. Spanbauer, The FirstAmendment Right to Petition Government for
a Redress of Grievances: Cut from a Different Cloth, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 15, 23-24
(1993) (reporting that the process of petitioning "ultimately led to the development of
Parliament," that the practice "also included quasi-judicial functions," and that "[dlue to
the intermingling of the executive, legislative, and judicial functions of government,
petitioning possessed a very broad meaning for the British citizenry").
16.
BILL OF RIGHTS (1689), reprinted in 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 43 (1971).
17.
See, e.g., MASSACHUSETTS BODY OF LIBERTIES, ch. 12 (1641), reprinted in 1
SCHWARTZ, supra note 16, at 73 ("Every man.., shall have libertie to come to any
publique Court, Councel, or Towne meeting, and either by speech or writeing... to
present any necessary motion, complaint, petition, Bill or information. . . ."). In addition
to petitions to the colonial governments, English colonists petitioned the government in
England. See Don L. Smith, The Right to Petition for Redress of Grievances:
Constitutional Development and Interpretations 10-45 (1971) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation in Government, Texas Tech University) (on file with the Ohio State Law
Journal) (describing charters and their relationship to the right to petition).
18.
See, e.g., MARYLAND DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. XI (1776) [hereinafter
MARYLAND DECLARATION], reprinted in 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 16, at 281 (proclaiming
that "every man hath a right to petition the Legislature, for the redress of grievances, in a
peaceable and orderly manner"). For a complete listing and reproduction of the early state
constitutional statements of the right to petition, see Andrews, Access to Court,supra note
7, at 604 n.159.
19.
See MARYLAND DECLARATION, supra note 18, art. XI, reprinted in 1 SCHWARTZ,
supra note 16, at 281.
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regardless of the body to which the petition was directed. ° In
colonial America especially, where colonists distrusted the courts
under the control of the royal governors, complainants often
chose to direct their private petitions to the colonial
legislatures. 2 Today, such private petitions to the legislature
may seem odd, because the separation of powers between the
branches of government is more clearly defined. Indeed, the
federal Constitution gives the judiciary the exclusive power to
decide private disputes.22 Yet the First Amendment, unlike some
state constitutions, does not limit the petition right to a single
branch of government. It gives the people the right to petition
"the Government."2 Thus, the historical concept of petitioning for
private relief is retained in the First Amendment, which protects
the right to petition all three branches of government.
The policies underlying the Petition Clause extend to the
courts. Petitions are a form of speech, but speech is elsewhere
protected in the First Amendment. 4 The petition right is a
separate right.2" By protecting the right to petition, the First
20.
The English Parliament regularly acted as a court in deciding private disputes.
See JAMES S. HART, JUSTICE UPON PETITION: THE HOUSE OF LORDS AND THE
REFORMATION OF JUSTICE 1621-1675, at 2-3 (1991) (describing the judicial practices of
the House of Lords in the seventeenth century); see also Spanbauer, supranote 15, at 1622 (discussing the nature of petitions).
21.
See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787,
at 154-55 (1969) (describing. colonial legislative practice and noting that "[t]hey
continually tried cases"). In The Federalist papers, James Madison stated that the
Virginia legislature "in many instances, decided rights which should have been left to
judiciary controversy" and that the intrusion was "becoming habitual and familiar." THE
FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 279 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (quoting THOMAS
JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 195 (1787)).
22.
Article III states: "Thejudicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (emphasis added). Congress, on the other hand,
received under Article I only "legislativePowers." Id. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added).
23.
U.S. CONST. amend. 1 (emphasis added). James Madison's first draft of the
Petition Clause mentioned only petitions to the federal legislature. See 2 SCHWARTZ,
supra note 16, at 1026 (reprinting Madison's proposal). The House Select Committee, of
which Madison was a member, soon revised Madison's proposal and stated a right to
petition the entire "government." House of Representatives Journal (Aug. 1789), reprinted
in 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 16, at 1122.
24.
U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of
speech ....).
25.
Few authorities fully develop the distinction between the rights of speech and
petition. See 2 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 16.3,
at 16-4 to 16-6 (2002) [hereinafter SMOLLA, FREEDOM OF SPEECH] (discussing the role of
the corollary rights of assembly, press, and petition as they relate to speech cases). In
recent years, however, courts and scholars have examined the petition right in more
detail. See San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 30 F.3d 424, 434-43 (3d Cir. 1994) (exploring in
depth the distinction between the petition and speech rights); see also Andrews, Access to
Court, supra note 7, at 558-61, 560 nn.9-12, 581 (recounting commentary and cases that
discuss the Petition Clause).
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Amendment guarantees that citizens will have an opportunity to
inform government officials of their views and to peaceably seek
change, both public and personal. Petitions to the courts serve
these purposes as well as petitions to the other branches of the
government. However, petitions to courts usually are the best
way to seek private redress, and they sometimes are the best
means by which to seek more general change in government.
Indeed, in the landmark civil rights decision of NAACP v.
Button," the Supreme Court recognized that "litigation may well
be the sole practicable avenue open to a minority to petition for
redress of grievances."27
Even though this seems to be a sensible view of the Petition
Clause, courts only recently have begun to recognize that the
petition right extends to the judicial branch. The early battles to
gain formal recognition of a right of court access initially
centered on due process, not on the First Amendment. This is not
surprising given that the guarantee of due process has long been
the primary and nearly exclusive constitutional provision against
which civil litigation standards have been tested.28 But the efforts
to gain a due process right of court access largely failed. In a
series of cases in the early 1970s, indigent civil litigants asked
the Supreme Court to rule that they had a due process right of
court access and to hold that filing fees violated that right. 9 The
Court refused to recognize such a right in all but the most
extraordinary of cases. The Court allowed a due process right
26.
371 U.S. 415 (1963).
27.
Id. at 430-31. In Button, the NAACP encouraged and assisted black citizens in
lawsuits seeking to integrate Virginia schools. Id. at 419-22. Virginia argued that the
NAACP activity constituted illegal solicitation of legal business. Id. at 423-26. The Court
held that the First Amendment protected the NAACP litigation efforts. Id. at 444-45. The
Court also noted the potential implication of the Petition Clause, as noted above, but it
relied primarily on the First Amendment right of association:
The NAACP is not a conventional political party; but the litigation it assists,
while serving to vindicate the legal rights of the members of the American Negro
community, at the same time and perhaps more importantly, makes possible the
distinctive contribution of a minority group to the ideas and beliefs of our
society. For such a group, association for litigation may be the most effective
form of political association.
Id. at 431.
28.
See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-15, 319-20
(1950) (noting that "[m]any controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words
of the Due Process Clause" and holding that due process requires reasonable notice in
judicial proceedings); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733-34 (1877) (noting that due
process reflects general principles of fairness and that in the context of judicial
proceedings it means "a course of legal proceedings according to those rules and principles
which have been established in our systems of jurisprudence for the protection and
enforcement of private rights").
29.
See generally Andrews, Access to Court, supra note 7, at 567-71 (discussing the
Court's treatment of court access under due process).
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only when the underlying litigation concerned a fundamental
right, such as marriage, and only when the remedy, such as a

divorce decree, could not be obtained outside of court." The Court
also held that prisoners have a due process right to gain access to
court on issues concerning their confinement or conviction,' but
it refused to extend a broad due process right of court access to
ordinary citizens.
Given the Court's reluctance to grant a due process right of
court access in these early 1970s cases, it is somewhat ironic that
the Court already had hinted at a First Amendment right of
court access. The Court developed this petition right in two
entirely different contexts-association and antitrust cases.
First, in Button, the Court recognized that the NAACP's
litigation efforts were a form of group petitioning.32 In 1964, one
year after Button, the Court in Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen v. Virginia33 extended this recognition to private, nonpolitical litigation when it ruled that Virginia could not enjoin a
union from assisting 4its members in settlements and litigation
with their employers:

30.
See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 375-76, 382-83 (1971) (holding that
due process gives indigent divorce claimants free access to court only because courts are
the sole means to dissolve a marriage and marriage is of fundamental importance); see
also Ortwein v. Schwartz, 410 U.S. 656, 658-60 (1973) (per curiam) (denying the due
process right of access to an indigent welfare claimant because the interest in welfare
payments "has far less constitutional significance" than divorce and because the claimant
had access to the administrative hearing process); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434,
443-46 (1973) (denying the due process right of access to an indigent bankruptcy
petitioner because an alleged bankrupt's interest "does not rise to the same constitutional
level" as the "associational" interest in dissolving a marriage and because "a debtor, . . . in
theory, and often in actuality, may adjust his debts by negotiated agreement with his
creditors").
31.
The Court now bases the prisoner's right of court access on due process. See
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579-80 (1974) ("The [prisoner's] right of access to the
courts... is founded in the Due Process Clause and assures that no person will be denied
the opportunity to present to the judiciary allegations concerning violations of
fundamental constitutional rights."). But the right has an unsettled history, and some
members of the Court continue to question its constitutional foundation. See, e.g., Bounds
v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 838-40 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court's
declaration of a "fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts [for
prisoners] ... is found nowhere in the Constitution"). The Court in 1996 limited the
prisoner's right of access by clarifying that the right did not require the state to
affirmatively assist prisoners in preparing and conducting litigation. Lewis v. Casey, 518
U.S. 343, 354 (1996) (acknowledging and "disclaiming" statements in Bounds that
suggested "the State must enable the prisoner to discover grievances, and to litigate
effectively once in court"). See generally Andrews, Access to Court, supra note 7, at 571-76
(discussing a prisoner's right of court access).
32.
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429-31 (1963). Refer to notes 26-27 supra and
accompanying text.
33.
377 U.S. 1 (1964).
34. Id. at 1-5.
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The State can no more keep these workers from using their
cooperative plan to advise one another than it could use
more direct means to bar them from resorting to the courts
to vindicate their legal rights. The right to petition the
35
courts cannot be so handicapped.
In this and subsequent union litigation cases, the Court relied
principally on the right of association, 6 but it nevertheless
continued to state that the petition right encompasses all forms
of litigation, not just those involving "political" concerns."
At the same time, the Court was independently developing
the petition right in a series of antitrust cases. In 1961, in
Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc. ," the Court applied the Petition Clause to limit the Sherman
Act. In Noerr, railroad companies engaged in a lobbying and
publicity campaign in which they lobbied the governor, among
other things, to veto legislation beneficial to the trucking
industry.39 The truckers responded with an antitrust suit,
charging that the railroads' lobbying efforts constituted illegal,
anticompetitive activity." The literal language of the Sherman
Act, which prohibits combinations made in restraint of trade,"
would have reached the railroads' lobbying, but the Court refused
to read the Sherman Act so broadly. 2 It held that Congress did
not intend the Sherman Act to extend to petitioning activity:4 3 the
35. Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
36. See United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576, 585-86 (1971) (holding
that the "collective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the courts is a
fundamental right within the protection of the First Amendment"); United Mine Workers
v. Ill. State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 221-22 (1967) (holding that "the freedom of speech,
association and petition guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments gives [the
union] . . . the right to hire attorneys on a salary basis to assist its members in the
assertion of their legal rights").
37.
See United Mine Workers, 389 U.S. at 223 (noting that "in Trainmen, where the
litigation in question was, as here, solely designed to compensate the victims of industrial
accidents, we rejected the contention made in dissent, that the principles announced in
Button were applicable only to litigation for political purposes" (citation omitted)).
38.
365 U.S. 127 (1961).
39.
Id. at 129-31.
40.
Id. at 129.
41.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits "le]very contract, combination.., or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). Section 2 punishes
"[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce." Id.
§ 2.
42.
Noerr, 365 U.S. at 136-37 ("[T]he Sherman Act does not prohibit.., persons
from associating... in an attempt to persuade the legislature or the executive to take
particular action with respect to a law that would produce a restraint or a monopoly.").
43.
The Court also recognized that the legislative history did not suggest an intent
by Congress to regulate political activity. Id. Refer to note 91 infra (discussing this
"essential dissimilarity" rationale for Noerr petitioning immunity).
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"right of petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of
Rights, and we cannot, of course, lightly impute to Congress an
intent to invade these freedoms."" The Court thus created a form
of immunity from antitrust liability for petitioning activity. In
1972, the Court in California Motor Transport v. Trucking
Unlimited45 extended this immunity to petitions directed at
courts and administrative agencies:
The same philosophy governs the approach of citizens or
groups of them to administrative agencies ...and to courts,
the third branch of Government. Certainly, the right to
petition extends to all departments of the Government. The
right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the
right ofpetition.46
The petition right of court access took on more importance in
1983, when the Court applied the right in a labor case. In Bill
Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB,4 7 the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) enjoined an employer from suing
picketing employees for defamation on the ground that the
employer's suit constituted a retaliatory and unfair labor practice
in violation of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). s The
Supreme Court held that the NLRB had read the NLRA too
broadly and that the injunction was improper.4 9 The Court relied
in part on federalism concerns," but it also noted that the
NLRB's action had intruded on the employer's right to petition
the state courts for redress of the alleged defamation:
In CaliforniaMotor Transport,we recognized that the right
of access to the courts is an aspect of the First Amendment
44.
Noerr, 365 U.S. at 138.
45.
404 U.S. 508 (1972).
46.
Id. at 510 (emphasis added).
47.
461 U.S. 731 (1983).
48.
Id. at 733-35. The NLRA provides that it is an "unfair labor practice for an
employer":
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed in [§] 157 [of the NLRA, which guarantees employees the right
to self-organize, form unions, and engage in other concerted actions of their
mutual aid or protection];
(4)

to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has
filed charges or given testimony under this subchapter ....
29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2000).
49. Bill Johnson's, 461 U.S. at 741-43.
50.
The Court noted that the NLRB must respect the state interest in providing a
civil remedy to its citizens and also argued against an expansive reading of the NLRA. Id.
at 742-43. These state interests were "maintenance of domestic peace," the need to
provide "a civil remedy for conduct touching interests 'deeply rooted in local feeling and
responsibility,"' and "protecting the health and well-being of its citizens." Id. at 741-42.
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right to petition the Government for redress of grievances.
Accordingly, we construed the antitrust laws as not
prohibiting the filing of a lawsuit, regardless of the
plaintiffs anticompetitive intent or purpose in doing so,
unless the suit was a "mere sham" filed for harassment
purposes. We should be sensitive to these First Amendment
values in construing the NLRA in the .present context....
The right of access to a court is too important to be called
an unfair labor practice solely on the ground that what is
sought in court is to enjoin employees from exercising a
protected right.5
Bill Johnson's is important in the development of the right
to petition courts for several reasons. First, it applied the right
outside of the antitrust context, in a labor case. Second, it applied
the right in a case brought by an individual, not an association as
in the union cases. It also used the right to protect a plaintiffs
ability to file private suits asserting common law torts, not
merely political litigation. As discussed below, Bill Johnson's did
not create a groundswell of recognition of the new petition right
by lower courts and commentators-it took another ten years and
an antitrust case, Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v.
Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc.," to do that-but Bill
Johnson's is significant in the Court's own development of the
right. 3 Moreover, Bill Johnson's became center stage in the
debate as to whether the petition right extends to any actions
other than winning suits. I next summarize that debate as it
existed before the Supreme Court issued its decision in BE & K.

51.
Id. at 741 (quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted); see also id. at 742-43
("Considering the First Amendment right of access to the courts and the State
interests ... we conclude that .... [t]he filing and prosecution of a well-founded lawsuit
may not be enjoined as an unfair labor practice, even if it would not have been
commenced but for the plaintiffs desire to retaliate.
...
); id. at 751-52 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (acknowledging that the Petition Clause extends to the courts and that the
narrow interpretation of the NLRA has "constitutional resonances").
52. 508 U.S. 49 (1993).
53.
Although the case was technically one of statutory interpretation, the Court
cites Bill Johnson's as authority for application of the petition right to the courts. See
Christopher v. Harbury, 122 S.Ct. 2179, 2186-87 (2002) (noting that the Court has based
the right of court access on different constitutional provisions and citing Bill Johnson's
and California Motor Transport as support for court access under the Petition Clause);
McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 484 (1985) (citing Bill Johnson's and stating in dicta
that the "[fliling of a complaint is a form of petitioning activity"); Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB,
467 U.S. 883, 896-98 (1984) (stating in dicta that "[tihe First Amendment right protected
in Bill Johnson's . . .is plainly a right of access to the courts ...for redress of alleged
wrongs" (quotation marks omitted)).
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B. The Different Standardsfor Defining MeritoriousLawsuits
Within the PetitionRight
The Court has stated repeatedly that the petition right, no
matter the branch of government at issue, is not absolute. The
leading case is McDonald v. Smith.54 There, the defendant sent a
letter to President Reagan allegedly defaming the plaintiff, and
the defendant argued that his statements were absolutely
immune from liability by virtue of their being stated in a
petition." The Court did not agree. It held that the statements in
a petition to the executive are subject to defamation damages as
with any other form of speech.56 The limited nature of the petition
right also underlies many of the Court's other petition cases. In
Noerr, for example, the Court held that antitrust petitioning
immunity was limited and does not protect lobbying efforts that
are merely "sham" petitions.5 7
That the petition right is limited is not the source of much
debate.5" Instead, the debate centers on how to define the limits
of the right.5 9 In McDonald, the standards for testing defamatory
petitions were easily at hand. Since the case alleged defamation
of a public figure, the Court simply borrowed the New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan standards applicable to defamatory speech. 0 In
54.
472 U.S. 479 (1985).
55.
Id. at 480-81.
56.
Id. at 485 ("There is no sound basis for granting greater constitutional
protection to statements made in a petition to the President than other First Amendment
expressions.").
57.
E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 14445 (1961).
There may be situations in which a publicity campaign, ostensibly
directed toward influencing governmental action, is a mere sham to
cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly
with the business relationships of a competitor and the application of the
Sherman Act would be justified.
Id. at 144 (emphasis added).
58.
Nevertheless, a few scholars argue that the Court is wrong and that the petition
right should be nearly absolute. See generally Norman B. Smith, "Shall Make No Law
Abridging..." An Analysis of the Neglected, Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition,54 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1153, 1154, 1187-88 (1986); Spanbauer, supra note 15.
59.
In addition to the merit debate discussed in this Article, another area of
contention is the Court's holding in Minnesota State Board of Community Colleges v.
Knight that the government has no duty to respond to citizen petitions. 465 U.S. 271,
283-84 (1984). See generally Andrews, Access to Court, supra note 7, at 634-44
(discussing the academic criticism of Knight and the historical bases for interpreting
whether the government has a duty to respond). Refer to note 13 supra.
60.
McDonald, 472 U.S. at 485 (holding that the New York Times standard for
defamation liability properly protected the defendant's speech and petition). In New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-81 (1964), and its progeny, the Court developed
the "breathing room" doctrine to protect speech in the defamation setting. Refer to Part
III infra (discussing the "breathing room" doctrine).
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Noerr, the Court had to create a new test for antitrust. It defined
sham lobbying to be that which is not genuinely aimed at
obtaining governmental action."' This is a subjective test in a
sense, but as the Court cautioned, anticompetitive intent itself is
irrelevant in determining whether a petition is sham.62 It is the
intent to get a governmental response that is the test for sham
lobbying efforts. So long as the lobbyist intends to get a
governmental response, his lobbying is protected petitioning, no
matter his purpose in seeking the response.
Translating this antitrust sham exception to judicial
petitioning proved problematic. The Court's decision in
63 particularly confused the question.
California Motor Transport
At some points, the Court seemed to use a subjective test similar
to that in Noerr when it discussed whether the petitioner had the
intent to use the adjudicatory process to harm its competitor.64
On the other hand, the Court suggested that a sham petition may
be broader in the judicial context because courts tolerate less
abusive behavior than the other two branches of government.65
Finally, the Court suggested an objective test for judicial

61.
Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144 (holding that the railroad lobbying at issue was protected
from antitrust liability because "the railroads were making a genuine effort to influence
legislation and law enforcement practices").
62.
Indeed, the Noerr Court explained that ill motives regularly accompany a
citizen's petitioning efforts:
The right of the people to inform their representatives in government of their
desires with respect to the passage or enforcement of laws cannot properly be
made to depend upon their intent in doing so. It is neither unusual nor illegal for
people to seek action on laws in the hope that they may bring about an
advantage to themselves and a disadvantage to their competitors .... Indeed, it
is quite probably people with just such a hope of personal advantage who provide
much of the information upon which governments must act. A construction of
the Sherman Act that would disqualify people from taking a public position on
matters in which they are financially interested would thus deprive the
government of a valuable source of information and, at the same time, deprive
the people of their right to petition in the very instances in which that right may
be of the most importance to them. We ...hold that, at least insofar as the
railroads' campaign was directed toward obtaining governmental action, its
legality was not at all affected by any anticompetitive purpose it may have had.
Id. at 139-40; see also United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965)
("Joint efforts to influence officials do not violate the antitrust laws even though intended
to eliminate competition.").
63.
Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
64.
Id. at 511 (quoting Noerr and commenting that "the power, strategy, and
resources of the petitioners were used to harass and deter respondents in their use of
administrative and judicial proceedings").
65. Id. at 512-13 (noting that the railroads' political campaign in Noerr "employed
deception and misrepresentations" and that "Imlisrepresentations], condoned in the
political arena, are not immunized when used in the adjudicatory process").
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petitions by noting that the underlying litigation at issue in
CaliforniaMotor Transport was baseless."
California Motor Transport spawned a debate among courts
and legal scholars as to what constituted sham litigation for
purposes of applying the antitrust immunity.67 Among other
things, the debate concerned the role of subjective intent relative
to the objective merits of the suit. Did bad intent alone-even
intent to abuse the process of the courts--expose a plaintiff to
antitrust liability, or must his suit also lack substantive merit?
In 1993, the Court in Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v.
Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc.,6" took up the question "left
unresolved" in California Motor Transport: "whether litigation
may be sham merely because a subjective expectation of success
does not motivate the litigant."7 The Court answered no.
The ProfessionalReal Estate Investors Court explained that
although it sometimes had used both subjective and objective
terminology to describe sham petitions,7 it always had held that
improper purpose alone could not transform otherwise legitimate
activity into a sham. 2 The Court then set out a two-part test for
sham litigation:
First, the lawsuit must be objectively baseless in the sense
that no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success
on the merits. If an objective litigant could conclude that
the suit is reasonably calculated to elicit a favorable
outcome, the suit is immunized under Noerr, and an
antitrust claim premised on the sham exception must fail.
66.
Id. ("[P]etitioners instituted the proceedings and actions... with or without
probable cause, and regardless of the merits of the cases." (second alteration in original)
(quotation marks omitted)); id. at 513 (suggesting that defendants' actions constituted "a
pattern of baseless, repetitive claims").
67.
See Thomas A. Balmer, Sham Litigation and the Antitrust Law, 29 BUFF. L.
REV. 39, 47-49 (1980) (discussing the "perplexity" of CaliforniaMotor Transport); William
R. Jacobs, The Quagmire Thickens: A Post-California Motor View of the Antitrust and
ConstitutionalRamificationsof Petitioningthe Government, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 281, 30107 (1973) (noting problems created by CaliforniaMotor Transport).
68.
The Court previously suggested that abuse of process was a form of sham
petitioning. See City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 379-80
(1991) (stating that sham lobbying "encompasses situations in which persons use the
governmental process-as opposed to the outcome of that process-as an anticompetitive
weapon"); CaliforniaMotor Transport, 404 U.S. at 513 (observing that the line between
legitimate resort to litigation and abuse of process is difficult to draw, but that "once it is
drawn, the case is established that abuse of those processes produced an illegal result...
effectively barring respondents from access to the agencies and courts").
69.
508 U.S. 49 (1993).
70.
Id. at 55, 57 (noting that "[tlhe courts of appeals have defined 'sham' in
inconsistent and contradictory ways").
71.
Id. at 57-58.
72.
Id. at 59.
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Only if challenged litigation is objectively meritless may a
court examine the litigant's subjective motivation. Under
this second part of our definition of sham, the court should
focus on whether the baseless lawsuit conceals "an attempt
to interfere directly with the business relationships of a
competitor," through the "use [of] the governmental
process-as opposed to the outcome of that process-as an
anti-competitive weapon."73
Even though the claim at issue in Professional Real Estate
Investors did not survive summary judgment, the Court held that
the claim was immune from antitrust liability. 4 Moreover,
because the claim had objective merit when filed, the subjective
motive of the plaintiff was irrelevant.
The Professional Real Estate Investors formulation thus
emphasizes the objective content of the underlying suit. Although
the Court used "expectation" to define the first prong of the test,
it nevertheless sets an objective standard. The relevant
expectation is not that of the actual litigant but instead that of a
reasonable person. If a suit has this objective merit, the plaintiff
cannot be held liable under the antitrust laws, no matter his
personal subjective intent.75 Moreover, the Court's description of
the second prong-motives that are irrelevant if the claim has
objective merit-includes not only an intent to harm a competitor
through the ultimate judgment but also an intent to abuse the
process of litigation. Thus, under Professional Real Estate
Investors, if the suit is objectively reasonable, it is irrelevant that
the plaintiff filed suit solely to hurt the competitor through the
burden of litigation.
The Court in Professional Real Estate Investors cautioned
against 20/20 hindsight in testing the objective merit of the
claim. The Court explained that the test is objective merit at the
outset, not whether the claim ultimately prevailed:
A winning lawsuit is by definition a reasonable effort at
petitioning for redress and therefore not a sham. On the
other hand, when the antitrust defendant has lost the
underlying litigation, a court must "resist the
understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning
by concluding" that an ultimately unsuccessful "action must
have been unreasonable or without foundation." The court
must remember that "[elven when the law or the facts
73.
Id. at 60-61 (alteration in original) (emphases added) (citations and footnote
omitted).
Id. at 65-66.
74.
75.
Id. at 57 ("[A]n objectively reasonable effort to litigate cannot be sham
regardless of subjective intent.").
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appear questionable or unfavorable at the outset, a party
may have an entirely reasonable ground for bringing suit."76
The Christiansburgcase, on which the Court relied, emphasized
the distinction between losing but meritorious suits, on the one
hand, and winning suits, on the other. Christiansburgheld that
prevailing defendants in Title VII cases are not entitled to
attorneys' fees by virtue of their success alone; they may recover
attorneys' fees only when the plaintiffs suit was "frivolous,
unreasonable, or without foundation."7 7 In this context, the Court
explained, "meritless" means "groundless or without foundation,
rather8 than simply that the plaintiff has ultimately lost his
7
case."
This definition of "meritless"--as something less than a
winning case for after-the-fact assessment of attorneys' fees or
other damages-is directly contrary to the definition used by the
Court in Bill Johnson's. The Court in Bill Johnson's developed
two tests for merit, depending on the stage of litigation at which
the merit of the case is assessed. First, as to whether the NLRB
could enjoin an ongoing suit filed by an employer against its
employees in state court, the Court adopted the test for summary
judgment-whether employer's lawsuit presents "a genuine issue
of material fact."79 If the suit presents such issues, the Board may
not enjoin the suit:
When a suit presents genuine factual issues, the state
plaintiffs First Amendment interest in petitioning the state
court for redress of his grievance, his interest in having the
factual dispute resolved by a jury, and the State's interest
in protecting the health and welfare of its citizens, lead us
to construe the Act as not permitting the Board to usurp
the traditional fact-finding function of the state-court jury
or judge.8"
This was the actual holding of the case. In the case before the
Court in Bill Johnson's, the NLRB had enjoined the employer's
suit without
testing whether the claim presented genuine issues
81
of fact.
The Bill Johnson's Court, however, did not end its discussion
with the test for ongoing suits. The Court also instructed the

76.
Id. at 60 & n.5 (alteration in original) (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v.
EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421-22 (1978)).
77.
Christiansburg,434 U.S. at 421.
78.
Id.
79.
Bill Johnson's Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 744, 745 & n.ll (1983).
80. Id. at 745.
81.
Id. at 733-35.
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NLRB as to what it could do once the underlying litigation was
completed. The second test, which governed the NLRB's ability to
assess damages, after-the-fact, to completed litigation, was quite
different:
In instances where the Board must allow the lawsuit to
proceed, if the employer's case in the state court ultimately
proves meritorious and he has judgment against the

employees, the employer should also prevail before the
Board, for the filing of a meritorious law suit, even for a
retaliatory motive, is not an unfair labor practice. If
judgment goes against the employer in the state court,

however, or if his suit is withdrawn or is otherwise shown to
be without merit, the employer has had its day in court, the
interest of the state in providing a forum for its citizens has
been vindicated, and the Board may then proceed to
adjudicate the ...unfair labor practice case. The employer's
suit having proved unmeritorious, the Board would be

warranted in taking that fact into account in determining
whether the suit had been filed in retaliation of the exercise
of the employees'.

. .

rights. If a violation is found, the

Board may order the employer to reimburse the employees
whom he had wrongfully sued for their attorneys' fees and
other expenses. 82
Thus, unlike in Professional Real Estate Investors and
Christiansburg,the Court in Bill Johnson's expressly defined
"unmeritorious" as a suit that did not prevail.83 Under this test,
only winning claims are absolutely immune from liability; losing
claims, even losing claims that had sufficient merit to withstand
summary judgment, are not protected.
The two tests of Bill Johnson's do not necessarily contradict
each other. As the Court explained, a case that has been
prosecuted to its completion is in a different position than an
ongoing suit, because once a suit is completed, "the employer has
had its day in court" and "the interest of the state in providing a
forum for its citizens has been vindicated." 4 Moreover, the
different levels of protection are consistent with the Court's other
First Amendment jurisprudence. The Court is more protective of
speech when it is considering a prior restraint against uttering
the speech than when it is considering damages for speech
already uttered."
82.
Id. at 747 (emphases added).
83.
Id.
84.
Id.
85.
See Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 553-54 (1993) (discussing the
prior restraint doctrine); 1 SMOLLA, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 25, § 15.9, at 15-10
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Of the two Bill Johnson's tests, it is the latter test, the one
applicable to completed litigation, that is parallel to the
Professional Real Estate Investors test. In Professional Real
Estate Investors, the Court was looking at completed litigation
and determining whether to assess antitrust damages against
the competitor for having filed and lost the underlying suit.86
Although the two tests both look at completed litigation, they set
a different standard. Under Bill Johnson's, the NLRB must ask
simply whether the employer won or lost its suit, but under
Professional Real Estate Investors, the court must look deeper
and determine whether the claim had objective merit when filed,
regardless of whether the plaintiff ultimately prevailed. Indeed,
because the claim at issue in Professional Real Estate Investors
did not survive summary judgment, it would have failed the Bill
Johnson's win-lose test. Yet the Court protected the claim from
antitrust liability, because it was objectively colorable.87 Thus
Professional Real Estate Investors provides more protection to
litigation than Bill Johnson's, and it is this difference that is at
the center of the controversy concerning the extent to which the
Petition Clause protects civil claims.
One could argue that Professional Real Estate Investors
superseded or overruled the win-lose test. After all, Bill
Johnson's itself presented only the question of the NLRB's power
to enjoin ongoing litigation, so the test as to completed litigation
was dicta. Indeed, in Professional Real Estate Investors, the
Court cited Bill Johnson's but referred only to its test for ongoing
suits:
Whether applying Noerr as an antitrust doctrine or
invoking it in other contexts, we have repeatedly reaffirmed
that evidence of anticompetitive intent or purpose alone
cannot transform otherwise legitimate activity into a sham.
Indeed, by analogy to Noerr's sham exception, we held that
even an "improperly motivated" lawsuit may not be
enjoined under the National Labor Relations Act as an
unfair labor practice unless such litigation is "baseless.""5
to 15-11 ("Distinguishing between prior restraints and subsequent punishment."). This is
not a perfect analogy, for in the case of an ongoing suit, the plaintiff has filed his suit, and
he has not been enjoined from initial access. Nevertheless, the Court's two-tiered test
reflects some of the deference afforded by the prior restraint doctrine. I argue elsewhere
that this is a form of breathing room protection. Refer to notes 274-78 infra and
accompanying text.
86.
Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508
U.S. 49, 54-56 (1993).
87.
Id. at 65 ("A court could reasonably conclude that [the plaintiffs] infringement
action was an objectively plausible effort to enforce rights.").
88.
Id. at 59 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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On the other hand, the Court in Professional Real Estate
Investors could have intended to leave the Bill Johnson'swin-lose
test undisturbed. It never addressed that test with approval or
disapproval. The fact that the Court in ProfessionalReal Estate
Investors set a different and more protective test for completed
litigation does not mean that the Court meant to change
anything about Bill Johnson's.Although both cases discussed the
First Amendment right to petition courts, both were in fact
exercises in statutory construction. Bill Johnson's interpreted the
NLRA, and Professional Real Estate Investors interpreted the
antitrust laws. Statutory differences alone could explain the two
tests, for the Petition Clause played only a part in each case.
In Bill Johnson's, the Court held that both the Petition
Clause and federalism concerns-deferring to the states'
interests in providing civil remedies for its citizens "-mandated
some protection of the employer's access to court. Yet, the Court
emphasized that it was reluctant to protect employers from
liability under the NLRA for two reasons. First, suits by a
powerful employer against individual employees raise a
particularly high risk of abuse, and second, Congress intended
0 The Petition
the NLRA to be a broad remedial statute."
Clause
and federalism concerns prompted the Court to give some
protection to the employer's suit, but the two countervailing
concerns argued for only minimal protection.
In Professional Real Estate Investors, the Court had a
different set of factors before it. First, unlike the NLRA, the
Court had not found a congressional intent to broadly read the
antitrust laws. To the contrary, the Court in Noerr found "no
basis whatever" in the legislative history of the Sherman Act for
suggesting an intent to regulate political activity, as opposed to
89. Bill Johnson's,461 U.S. at 741-42.
90. Id. at 740-41. The Court stated:
Sections 8(a)(1) and (4) of the Act are broad, remedial provisions that guarantee
that employees will be able to enjoy their rights ... by suing an employee who
files charges with the Board or engages in other protected activities, an employer
can place its employees on notice that anyone who engages in such conduct is
subjecting himself to the possibility of a burdensome lawsuit. Regardless of how
unmeritorious the employer's suit is, the employee will most likely have to retain
counsel and incur substantial legal expenses to defend against it.
Furthermore,... the chilling effect of a state lawsuit upon an employee's
willingness to engage in protected activity is multiplied where the complaint
seeks damages in addition to injunctive relief. Where, as here, such a suit is filed
against hourly-wage waitresses or other individuals who lack the backing of a
union, the need to allow the Board to intervene and provide a remedy is at its
greatest.
Id. (citations omitted). Section 8(a)(1) and (4) of the NLRA, contained in 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a) (2000), is reproduced at note 48 supra.
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business activity.9 Furthermore, the risk of litigation abuse is
not as high in the antitrust setting as it is in the labor context,
because the typical dispute is between commercial competitors.
There may be disparity between competitors, but not as much as
between an employer and an hourly worker. Thus, both the need
to curb litigation abuse and the congressional intent to do so are
more evident under the NLRA than under the antitrust laws.
In addition, the chilling effect of the statute arguably is less
under the NLRA than under the antitrust laws. When the NLRB
charges that a lawsuit is in violation of the NLRA, it brings an
administrative proceeding with limited discovery and remedies.9 2
In contrast, a charge that a suit violated the antitrust laws
usually is brought in a civil action, with full discovery rights and
burdens, and possible treble damages." These differences in the
statutory policies and applications, and not the Petition Clause,
could explain the different levels of protection in the Professional
Real Estate Investors and Bill Johnson's tests.
Moreover, to hold that Professional Real Estate Investors
sets the constitutional test would mean that the Court was
declaring the Bill Johnson's win-lose test to be unconstitutional
and no longer applicable in the labor setting. If losing but
otherwise objectively meritorious suits are protected by the First
Amendment, then, as a matter of constitutional law, the NLRB
cannot assess damages against losing suits as the Court
suggested in Bill Johnson's. Such a broad reading of Professional
Real Estate Investors would run counter to the Court's doctrine
that it does not lightly pass on constitutional questions.94
Despite these uncertainties, most courts and legal observers
have applied Professional Real Estate Investors outside of
antitrust, to limit other laws, such as the tort of abuse of process,
as if ProfessionalReal Estate Investors set the First Amendment
91.
E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 13637 (1961). This is called the "essential dissimilarity" rationale of Noerr petitioning
immunity in that the activity the Sherman Act was meant to regulate is essentially
different from political activity. Id. (marking the "essential dissimilarity between an
agreement jointly to seek legislation or law enforcement and the agreements traditionally
condemned by [the Sherman Act]"); see also David McGowan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust
Immunity: State Action and Federalism, Petitioningand the FirstAmendment, 17 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 293, 306-07 (1994) (discussing this basis for Noerr immunity).
92.
See 29 U.S.C. §§ 160-161 (2000) (setting forth the powers and procedures for
NLRB proceedings).
93.
See, e.g., 2 PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 303, at 27-28 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing
antitrust remedies, including criminal penalties and treble damages).
94. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (noting "the prudential concern that constitutional
issues not be needlessly confronted").
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standard.9 5 ProfessionalReal Estate Investors triggered a virtual
explosion in cases and academic commentary. An ever growing
number of courts and scholars are recognizing a universal right,
under the Petition Clause, to gain access to court." In doing so,
most of these authorities cite Professional Real Estate Investors
and apply its objective merit test with no consideration of the
possible conflict with Bill Johnson's.
Proportion-Air, Inc. v. Buzmatics, Inc.97 is an example.
There, a competitor sued another for patent infringement, and
the defendant raised several counterclaims, including charges
that the plaintiffs filing of the suit was itself a violation of
both federal antitrust laws and various state torts, such as
tortious interference with business relationships.9 " After a
bench trial, the court ruled against the original plaintiff on all
claims, including the defendant's counterclaims. On appeal,
the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded on the
counterclaims, holding that the trial court must conduct a
review of the objective merit of the original patent claim under
ProfessionalReal Estate Investors.0 0
The ProfessionalReal Estate Investors objective test was of
course the proper test for determination of federal antitrust
immunity, but it was not necessarily the proper test for the state
tort law counterclaims in Proportion-Air.In the absence of some
form of state law immunity, the only immunity that the federal
court could apply to the state tort claims would be that required
under the First Amendment. The fact that the plaintiff did not
prevail on its patent claim would have been enough to satisfy Bill
Johnson's, but the Federal Circuit never addressed whether Bill
Johnson's might set the First Amendment standard.
A very few courts have recognized that Professional Real
Estate Investors might not set the constitutional standard for
protection under the Petition Clause, but they rarely analyze the

95.
See, e.g., Cove Rd. Dev. v. W. Cranston Indus. Park Assocs., 674 A.2d 1234,
1235, 1238-39 (R.I. 1996) (applying the ProfessionalReal Estate Investors objective test to
determine whether the defendant's losing zoning suit was protected against liability
under state torts of malicious prosecution and abuse of process).
96.
Many of the cases and commentary are collected in my prior articles. See
Andrews, Access to Court, supra note 7, at 590 nn.118-19; Andrews, Motive Restrictions,
supra note 7, at 679 nn.60-62, 680 n.63.
97.
No. 94-1426, 1995 WL 360549 (Fed. Cir. June 14, 1995) (vacating the district
court's findings of fact and conclusions of law that focused on subjective intent and
remanding with instructions to apply ProfessionalReal Estate Investors' objective test).
98.
Id. at *1.
99.
Id.
100.
Id. at *2-*3.
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In United States v. Robinson,"1 for
example, the court considered whether to apply a form of
petitioning immunity to limit the Fair Housing Act." 3 There, the
government charged that the defendants had filed a state lawsuit
to enforce a zoning ordinance for a discriminatory purpose-to
stop a family with disabled foster children from moving into the
neighborhood."' The defendants claimed that their suit was
protected petitioning activity."' In response, the court noted the
First Amendment and policy elements in both Professional Real
Estate Investors and Bill Johnson's and concluded that

merit standard itself..

petitioning protection should be determined on a statute-bystatute basis."°6 The court examined the legislative history and
policies of the Fair Housing Act and found that it too required a
form of petitioning immunity."' The court stopped its analysis
short, however, and did not consider the proper standard for
determining the immunity."' The court held that the defendants
before it were entitled to protection because their zoning suit had
objective merit." 9 The court did not consider whether the win-lose
standard of Bill Johnson's might be the proper standard, even
though the defendants voluntarily dismissed their zoning suit"'
and did not prevail within the meaning of Bill Johnson's."

101.
At the other extreme, a few observers continue to argue that Noerr and its
progeny, including Professional Real Estate Investors, are purely applications of the
antitrust laws and have no First Amendment implications. See Andrews, Access to Court,
supra note 7, at 589-90, 591 n.119 (collecting academic commentary).
No. 3:92CV00345, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22327 (D. Conn. Jan. 26, 1995).
102.
103.
Id. at *15-*16 (discussing the conflict between the "First Amendment right of
petition" and the "statutory right to equality in housing"). The federal Fair Housing Act
makes it unlawful to discriminate in housing based on race, religion, family status, or
handicap or "to coerce, intimidate, threaten or interfere with any person in the exercise or
enjoyment of ... any right granted or protected by [the Act]." 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604, 3617
(2000).
104. Robinson, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22327, at *1-*3.
Id. at *10-*12.
105.
106.
See id. at *15-*18 (examining the conflict between rights arising under federal
equal housing provisions and the constitutional right of petition).
107.
Id. at *29-*33.
See id.
108.
109. Id. at *35-*36.
110.
Id. at *6.
111.
In the few other cases in which the court has identified the issue, the distinction
often is irrelevant and discussion of the difference is dicta, as in Cardtoons,L.C. v. Major
League Baseball PlayersAss'n, 208 F.3d 885, 889-90, 889 n.4 (10th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
In that case, the court considered whether a pre-litigation "cease-and-desist" letter was
protected petitioning activity, immune from state tort liability for tortious interference
with contract. Id. at 886-87. The author of the letter claimed the letter was protected
under Professional Real Estate Investors, and the original panel of the Tenth Circuit
agreed. Id. at 887. On rehearing en banc, the Tenth Circuit reversed the panel. Id. at 893.
The court first noted that "Noerr immunity" is a misnomer when applied outside of
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There was one prominent exception to this almost rote
application of Professional Real Estate Investors. In labor cases
(before BE & K), the NLRB regularly followed Bill Johnson's.n 2
When an employee charged that an employer had filed suit
against him for a retaliatory purpose, the NLRB allowed the
employer's suit to continue to its completion, but once the case
was completed, the NLRB merely looked to whether the employer
had prevailed to determine whether the suit was protected
petitioning. If the employer had won its suit, then the NLRB did
not declare it to be an unfair labor practice. On the other hand, if
the employer's suit ended with anything other than a judgment
in the employer's favor,1 3 the NLRB presumed that the suit
lacked merit and was no longer protected under Bill Johnson's.
The NLRB then looked to whether the employer had a retaliatory
motive, and the NLRB often presumed such motive when the
employer bore anti-union animus and when the employer's suit
challenged activity protected under the NLRA."4 Thus, whether
antitrust, because Noerr, as developed by ProfessionalReal Estate Investors, has elements
of both statutory construction and First Amendment jurisprudence. Id. at 889-91. The
court then observed that the statutory element may mandate protection not required
under the Petition Clause, and it cited the conflict between the merit standards of
ProfessionalReal Estate Investors and Bill Johnson's as an illustration of this difference.
Id. at 889 & n.4. Ultimately, however, the court denied petitioning immunity because it
held that a pre-litigation letter is not a petition to the government. Id. at 892-93. Thus,
the distinction was not decisive in the case, and the court had no need to decide the
proper merit standard.
112.
This summary of NLRB practice largely comes from that reported in the BE &
K case. See Brief for the NLRB, at *14-* 17, BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 122 S. Ct. 2390
(2002) (No. 01-518) [hereinafter NLRB Brief] (discussing NLRB practice), available at
2002 WL 449275; Brief for Petitioner, at *21-*28, BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 122 S. Ct.
2390 (2002) (No. 01-518) [hereinafter Petitioner's Brief] (same), available at 2001 WL
177612; United States Supreme Court Official Transcript, BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB,
122 S. Ct. 2390, at *14-*26, *29-*42, *46-*49 (2002) (No. 01-518) [hereinafter Official
Transcript] (same), available at 2002 WL 753390; see also Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc.
v. NLRB, 53 F.3d 1085, 1087-88 (9th Cir. 1995) (same).
113.
An issue in applying the Bill Johnson's win-lose test was what to do with cases
that ended at the plaintiffs own volition. The Bill Johnson's Court had suggested that a
loss included more than just adverse judgments after trial on the merits: "If judgment
goes against the employer in the state court, however, or if his suit is withdrawn or is
otherwise shown to be without merit, the employer has had its day in court, the interest of
the state in providing a forum for its citizens has been vindicated, and the Board may
then proceed to adjudicate the ... unfair labor practice case." Bill Johnson's Rests., Inc. v.
NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 747 (1983) (emphasis added). In NLRB v. Vanguard Toys, Inc., the
Second Circuit addressed this question and rejected the NLRB's position that "any
termination favorable to the defendants [in the original employer suit] gives rise to a
presumption that a suit lacked a reasonable basis in fact or law." 981 F.2d 62, 65 (2d Cir.
1992). Even though the court noted that "[t]here are many reasons a party may choose to
withdraw a suit," it adopted an objective merit test for suits the employer voluntarily
withdrew. Id. at 66.
114.
In the BE & K case, the NLRB claimed there were several factors that the
NLRB could consider in finding retaliatory motive, but the Court found that these two
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the employer won or lost its suit often was the dispositive
question in determining whether an employer's suit violated the
NLRA.
For the most part, the lower courts upheld this approach. In
Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB,"' for example, several
unions called a strike against Diamond, and Diamond sued the
unions for allegedly defamatory statements in letters that the
unions sent to Diamond's customers." 6 Diamond did not prevail
in this suit."7 The primary union then filed a charge with the
NLRB, claiming that Diamond's defamation suit was an unfair
labor practice, and the NLRB agreed."8 On appeal, the NLRB,
citing Bill Johnson's, claimed that the lawsuit lacked merit
because Diamond did not prevail, but Diamond, relying on
ProfessionalReal Estate Investors, insisted that the NLRB should
have looked to whether its suit had objective merit at the
outset."9 The Ninth Circuit rejected Diamond's argument:
Diamond is mistaken. Whether a lawsuit lacks a reasonable
basis in fact or law is relevant only to whether the Board
may enjoin a lawsuit. After a lawsuit is over, however, the
standard changes. If the suit results "in a judgment adverse
to the plaintiff, the Board may then consider the matter
further and, if it is found that the lawsuit was filed with
retaliatory intent, the Board may find a violation and order
appropriate relief." Thus, bringing an action that proves
unmeritorious may constitute an unfair labor practice, even
though the suit did not lack20 a reasonable basis in law or
fact at the time it was filed.
Despite such failure in the courts, employers in labor
disputes continued to press for application of the more protective
ProfessionalReal Estate Investors standard. In recent years, the
courts in labor cases have persisted in applying Bill Johnson's
win-lose test, but at least some courts have lent a sympathetic
ear to the employers' arguments. In White v. Lee,"' for example,
factors were the principal bases for finding such motive in that case. See BE & K Constr.
Co. v. NLRB, 122 S. Ct. 2390, 2400-01 (2002); NLRB Brief, supra note 112, at 46-47
(discussing factors in determining motive).
115.
53 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 1995).
116.
Id. at 1087.
117.
The state court dismissed on the ground that the letters were opinion and
therefore not subject to defamation damages. Id.
118. Id.
119.
Id. at 1087-88.
120.
Id. at 1088 (citations omitted) (quoting Bill Johnson's Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461
U.S. 731, 749 (1983)). The court distinguished Professional Real Estate Investors as
setting the standard only under the antitrust laws. Id.
121.
227 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2000).
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the Ninth Circuit reexamined the Bill Johnson's win-lose test
and characterized it as dictum.'22 The court stated that it was
bound by Diamond Walnut to apply the test in the labor context,
but it held that it would apply the more generous Professional
Real Estate Investors objective merit test in all other contexts. 22
Likewise, in Petrochem Insulation,Inc. v. NLRB, 24 the District of
Columbia Circuit ultimately rejected the employer's argument
that ProfessionalReal Estate Investors should control in the labor
case before it, but the court urged the Supreme Court to "one day
create a uniform standard for sham litigation governing both
NLRA and non-NLRA cases (or explain why the First
Amendment protects erring litigants less in the NLRA context
than in others).''
In sum, this was the setting when the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in BE & K. Most legal authorities recognized a
right of court access under the Petition Clause, but they did not
give much consideration to the proper definition of that right.
Most assumed that Professional Real Estate Investors set the
standard. The few courts that considered the issue tended to
limit application of the Bill Johnson's win-lose test to labor cases,
but at least in that context, the NLRB and courts held fast and
applied the more stringent win-lose test.
II. THE BE & KDECISION
In BE & K Construction Co. v. NLRB, 26 the Court had an
opportunity to resolve the uncertainty. The Court granted
certiorari to consider whether the NLRB could continue to
penalize employers who, for a retaliatory purpose, filed but lost
objectively reasonable suits against employees or unions. 127 This
suggested that the Court was ready to settle the constitutional
debate. Yet, the Court did not decide the question. Instead, the
Court decided the case on narrow statutory grounds and

122.
See id. at 1235-36.
123.
Id. at 1236 (noting that "this court has applied 'the First Amendment rationale
of the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine' broadly to claims not involving antitrust law" and that
"it is the NLRA cases that we treat differently from all others with respect to the NoerrPennington 'sham' exception"). The claims in White v. Lee were brought under the Fair
Housing Act, and the court found that the government's activity in response to the
litigation was excessive and would have violated plaintiffs' First Amendment rights,
regardless of whether the ProfessionalReal Estate Investors test or Bill Johnson's test
applied. Id. at 1237.
124.
240 F.3d 26 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
125.
Id. at 32.
126.
122 S.Ct. 2390 (2002).
127.
Id. at 2392.
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corrected only the NLRB's standard for finding retaliatory
motive. Although the Court has not settled the debate, its three
opinions offer some insights into the approach that the Court
may take in the future to resolve the difficult constitutional
question.
A.

The Background of the Litigation

The BE & K case grew out of a labor dispute in California."8
BE & K, a non-union construction company based in
Birmingham, Alabama, entered into a contract to modernize a
California steel plant.'2 9 Several local unions resisted the hire of
BE & K and, according to BE & K, began a campaign to force the
steel plant owner to stop doing business with BE & K.' The
unions' efforts included picketing, advocating for application of
toxic waste ordinances to the project, and alleging that the job
site violated health and safety standards.' BE & K responded
with a lawsuit, filed in federal court in California, alleging that
the unions' activities violated the labor laws and (later in an
amended complaint) the antitrust laws.2 2
This was not the first tangle between BE & K and unions.
They are notoriously hostile to each other. Unions have engaged
in campaigns against BE & K,"3 the most famous of which was a
128. For a more detailed discussion of the background of the case, see BE & K
Construction Co. v. NLRB, 246 F.3d 619, 621-24 (6th Cir. 2001). In addition, the labor
dispute is summarized in the two reported decisions of the trial court in BE & K's original
California federal suit against the unions. See USS-POSCO Indus. v. Contra Costa
County Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 721 F. Supp. 239, 241 (N.D. Cal. 1989); USSPOSCO Indus. v. Contra Costa County Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 692 F. Supp.
1166, 1167-68 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
129. BE & K, 246 F.3d at 621.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 621-22. That effort included state court litigation filed by the unions in
which they sought to enjoin alleged violations of the California Health and Safety Code in
the removal of hazardous material from the job site. See USS-POSCO, 721 F. Supp. at
241. As noted later by the court in BE & K's federal suit against the unions, the unions'
original "state court action was not successful on its merits" in that the unions' requests
for relief were denied, but the union suit likely had a reasonable factual and legal
foundation. Id. at 241-42. Thus, the legitimacy of the unions' suit.itself turned on the
distinction between the Bill Johnson's win-lose test and the Professional Real Estate

Investors objective test. The federal court applied the more protective ProfessionalReal
Estate Investors test and dismissed BE & K's claim. Id. This issue was not raised for
review by the Supreme Court.
132. The plant operator, USS-POSCO, joined BE & K as plaintiffs in the suit. See
USS-POSCO, 692 F. Supp. at 1167-68.
133. For example, union officials in 1989 explained that the carpenters' union
"singled out" BE & K for an "aggressive corporate campaign" by the union because
BE & K was "the only big nonunion contractor that market[ed] itself to owners as a
strikebreaker." William G. Krizan, Unions, BE & K Square Off, ENG'G NEWS-RECORD,

Apr. 13, 1989, at 11 (interviewing Dean Sooter, the carpenters' union second general vice-
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strike at a paper mill in International Falls, Minnesota, which
provoked violence.13 ' Likewise, BE & K has been anti-union in its
corporate policies and actions, including litigation against the
unions. ' BE & K has filed a number of suits against unions and
has been moderately successful in this litigation. For example, a
federal jury in Illinois awarded BE & K $544,000 in damages
after finding that the unions had illegally threatened a36 secondary
boycott and caused BE & K to lose construction work.'
BE & K's federal suit against the unions concerning the
California job did not fare as well. In a series of motions, the
federal district court dismissed, or entered summary judgment,
against BE & K on almost all of its claims and, after losing these
motions, BE & K voluntarily dismissed the remaining claim."7
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit gave BE & K partial vindication by
Ninth Circuit
reversing a few of the trial court's rulings, but the
138
claims.
K's
&
BE
of
dismissal
the
disturb
did not
Soon after BE & K originally filed its federal suit, the unions
filed charges with the NLRB, claiming that BE & K's suit
constituted an unfair labor practice."19 The NLRB stayed its
proceedings until BE & K's claims were resolved in federal
court.'4 ° After the conclusion of BE & K's federal suit, in
September 1999, the NLRB found that BE & K had violated the
NLRA by filing the suit.' It ordered BE & K to refrain from
filing any similar suit, to reimburse the unions for their costs in

president).
134.
For a discussion of the Minnesota incident and the continuing hostility between
BE & K and unions, see Ex parte United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 688 So. 2d 246, 24749 (Ala. 1997).
135.
See Krizan, supra note 133 (describing BE & K as a strikebreaking and unionbusting company).
See BE & K Constr. Co. v. Will & Grundy Counties Bldg. Trades Council, 156
136.
F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 1998) (affirming BE & K's verdict on appeal). BE & K won a substantial
jury verdict in a similar Arkansas case-$125,000 in compensatory damages and $20
million in punitive damages-but the Eighth Circuit reversed much of the judgment and
ordered a new trial. BE & K Constr. Co. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 90 F.3d 1318, 1321
(8th Cir. 1996).
137.
See USS-POSCO Indus. v. Contra Costa County Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,
721 F. Supp. 239 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (granting defendant's motion for partial summary
judgment as to BE & K's claims concerning the unions' state court suit); USS-POSCO,
692 F. Supp. at 1167 (granting summary judgment as to BE & K's claims concerning the
unions' lobbying efforts but denying summary judgment as to BE & K's claims concerning
the unions' state court suit).
USS-POSCO Indus. v. Contra Costa County Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 31
138.
F.3d 800, 810-12 (9th Cir. 1994).
139.
BE & K Constr. Co., 329 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 68 (1999) (NLRB decision and
order), available at 1999 WL 883851, at *1.
140.
BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 246 F.3d 619, 624 (6th Cir. 2001).
BE & K, 329 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 68, at *2.
141.
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defending the federal suit (including their attorneys' fees plus
interest), and to post notices informing employees in Alabama
and California that the company had violated the NLRA.'11
BE & K appealed to the Sixth Circuit.14 3 BE & K made two
attacks against the NLRB's finding of an unfair labor practice.'4
First, BE & K argued that the NLRB had inappropriately applied
the Bill Johnson's win-lose test instead of the ProfessionalReal
Estate Investors objective merit test.' 4' The Sixth Circuit rejected
this argument. It held that ProfessionalReal Estate Investors, as
an antitrust case, was "totally inapplicable" to test the merits of
BE & K's suit under the NLRA.' Instead, the Bill Johnson's
"bifurcated system of analysis" controlled:
Prior to a court ruling on the merits of the employer's suit,
the Board will not find an unfair labor practice unless the
underlying lawsuit was without reasonable basis. Following
a court determination that the employer's claims are
without merit, however, there is no longer a need to prevent
interference with the First Amendment right to seek
judicial redress. At that point, the Board is justified in
examining the motives of the employer to determine
whether the company unfairly dragged the workers or their
representatives into court to further illegal objectives.
The Sixth Circuit then noted that the California federal court
had dismissed BE & K's claims "on the merits," as opposed to
some other form of dismissal, and held that the NLRB was
free to investigate the motives of BE & K in filing
therefore
14
suit.
BE & K's second argument went to the NLRB's finding of
retaliatory motive. BE & K argued that the NLRB had inferred
this motive merely from the fact that BE & K had failed in its
lawsuit. 49 The Sixth Circuit noted that if the NLRB in fact had
142.

Id. at *"17-'18.

In oral argument before the U.S. Supreme Court, counsel for BE & K explained
143.
that its appeal from the NLRB ruling went to the Sixth Circuit because BE & K was no
longer doing business in California and most of its work was in the Sixth Circuit. Official
Transcript, supra note 112, at *15.
BE & K raised three basic arguments on appeal. It argued that (1) the unions
144.
could not seek relief under the NLRA because they were not BE & K's employees, (2) the
NLRB erred in finding that its federal suit was an unfair labor practice, and (3) attorneys'
fees were an improper remedy even if BE & K were in violation of the NLRA. BE & K, 246
F.3d at 621. The Sixth Circuit rejected all three arguments, but this Article addresses
only the second argument.
Id. at 628-29.
145.
146.
Id. at 629.
147.
Id.
148. Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 629-30.
149.
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done this, it "would run the serious risk of conflating the two
elements of the Bill Johnson's unfair labor practice analysis and
thus infringe upon the protections afforded by the [Pletition
[C]lause of the First Amendment."15 ° Nevertheless, the NLRB
could consider the loss as one factor in determining motive so
long as there was other evidence.' The court then found the
following circumstantial evidence of BE & K's retaliatory motive:
that BE & K had realleged claims after they were dismissed by
the federal court, that BE & K sought treble damages under the
antitrust laws, and that BE & K named two unions as
defendants in the federal suit even though the two unions had
not been formal parties to the suits that BE & K challenged." '
This, according to the Sixth Circuit, constituted "substantial
evidence" on which the NLRB could find an illegal retaliatory
motive.'53 The court thus affirmed the NLRB's findings and
penalties."'
BE & K petitioned for an en banc rehearing by the Sixth
Circuit and was denied."' BE & K then petitioned for certiorari
with the U.S. Supreme Court." 6 On January 4, 2002, the Court
granted certiorari but limited the issue for review." ' The Court
stated the sole question as follows: "Did the Court of Appeals err
in holding that under Bill Johnson's the NLRB may impose
liability on an employer for filing a losing retaliatory lawsuit,
even if the employer could show the suit was not objectively
'5 Thus, the
baseless under Professional Real Estate Investors?""
Court seemed poised to resolve the merit debate under the
Petition Clause.
In the briefs before the Court, the parties focused squarely
on the two merit tests. ' BE & K argued that the NLRB's
150. Id. at 630.
151.
Id. The court cited Bill Johnson's for this proposition: "[Tihe United States
Supreme Court itself, in Bill Johnson's, admitted that the mere finding that an
employer's suit against employees or unions is unmeritorious warrants the [NLRB]
'taking that fact into account in determining whether the suit had been filed in
retaliation' . . . ." Id. (quoting Bill Johnson's Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 747
(1983)).
152.
Id.
153. Id. at 630-31.
154. Id.
NLRB Brief, supra note 112, at *1.
155.
156.
Id.
157.
BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 534 U.S. 1074 (2002) (mem.).
158.
Id. (citations omitted). BE & K had sought certiorari on other issues, such as
whether the NLRB had authority to award attorneys' fees, but the Court limited its grant
to the single issue. BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 122 S. Ct. 2390, 2398 (2002).
159.
Petitioner's Brief, supra note 112, at *12-*13; NLRB Brief, supra note 112, at
*14-*15; Reply Brief for Petitioner at *1, BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 122 S. Ct. 2390
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application of the Bill Johnson's win-lose test was a "dangerous
anomaly in the law threatening the entire business community's
right of access to the courts on labor issues."'' 0 It argued that the
Bill Johnson's win-lose test was ambiguous dicta and that the
only test set by Bill Johnson's was the test for ongoing litigation,
which was an objectively reasonable standard-similar to that in
ProfessionalReal Estate Investors.' BE & K further argued that
Professional Real Estate Investors set the proper constitutional
test and that it had been "broadly and uniformly applied in every
imaginable context."'62 According to BE & K, the Bill Johnson's
win-lose test would chill an employer's First Amendment rights
because "it is impossible for employers to know in advance how
litigation will be resolved" and that, faced with this dilemma,
many employers will "undoubtedly forego exercise of their rights
to avoid incurring statutory liability for having predicted
wrongly."'' 3
In response, the NLRB' argued that the win-lose standard
of Bill Johnson's was not dicta, 6 ' that it had been part of the
labor law since 1983, and that Bill Johnson's appropriately set
two tests to reflect the different levels of protection applicable to
prior restraints and to post-action damages.'6 6 The NLRB
distinguished Professional Real Estate Investors as an antitrust
doctrine, and it warned against "the breath-taking implications"
of applying the objective test outside of the context of antitrust
immunity.'67 In this regard, the NLRB contended that the broad
test would "invalidate numerous federal and state statutory
provisions and rules"'6 8 such as other federal labor laws,' 9

(2002) (No. 01-518), available at 2002 WL 523018.
160.
Petitioner's Brief, supra note 112, at *14.
161.
Id. at *25.
162.
Id. at *17-*18.
163.
Id. at *26.
164.
Both the NLRB and the complaining unions were respondents in the case, and
both filed briefs. Their arguments are largely duplicative of each other. This Article cites
only to the NLRB brief because it, and not the union brief, is available on Westlaw (2002
WL 449275) and because only counsel for the NLRB participated in oral argument on
behalf of all respondents.
165.
NLRB Brief, supra note 112, at *22-*24. The NLRB argued that because some
of the claims in the underlying suit in Bill Johnson's already had been dismissed prior to
the NLRB injunction, the win-lose test was applicable to the resolution of those claims. Id.
166.
Id. at *22-*25, *35-*38.
167.
Id. at *30.
168.
Id.
169.
The NLRB argued that Section 7 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 107
(2000), allowed fees to be shifted to a plaintiff who seeks injunctive relief, even if the
request is not frivolous. NLRB Brief, supra note 112, at *31.
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)(1), 7 ' the common law tort
of abuse of process, 7 ' and the court's inherent power to sanction
litigants, 7 ' all of which, it argued, "authorize the imposition of
fees on a losing plaintiff without a finding that the plaintiffs suit
lacked a reasonable basis."173 The NLRB finished this litany by
arguing that extension of Professional Real Estate Investors
would constitutionalize the "American rule"; in other words,
Congress could no longer enact laws that required losing
plaintiffs to pay the defendant's attorneys' fees.'7 4 Finally, the
NLRB argued that the differences between labor suits and
antitrust suits, such as the availability of treble damages in civil
antitrust suits, give potential antitrust liability a much greater
chilling effect than the possibility of an NLRB labor charge.'
This greater threat, argued the NLRB, warranted more
protection for First Amendment rights in the antitrust context
than inthe labor area.176
The Court heard oral arguments on April 16, 2002.177
Because the questions of the Court were scattered and addressed
a number of issues,' it is difficult to characterize the arguments.
7
Some questions addressed whether Bill Johnson's was dicta1 1
and whether Professional Real Estate Investors was a
constitutional doctrine."' Several questions asked whether
Professional Real Estate Investors would invalidate fee-shifting
statutes"" and whether the NLRA was more punitive or

170.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)(1) requires a plaintiff to certify, among
other things, that he is not filing his complaint "for any improper purpose." FED. R. CIV.
P. 11(b)(1). The NLRB argued that proper purpose is an independent requirement under
Rule 11. NLRB Brief, supra note 112, at *32 (citing Andrews, Motive Restrictions, supra
note 7, for support).
171.
The NLRB argued that under some applications of the tort of abuse of process, it
is not necessary to show that the underlying claim lacked merit. Id. at *32-*33.
172.
The NLRB argued that courts have the inherent power, absent First
Amendment considerations, to sanction litigants who act in bad faith without inquiring as
to the objective basis of their actions. Id. at *33-*34.
173.
Id. at *30.
174.
Id. at *34.
175.
Id. at *40-*45.
176.
Id. at *44-*45.
177.
Official Transcript, supra note 112, at *1.
178.
According to Supreme Court practice, the transcript does not reveal the identity
of the member of the Court who is asking a question in oral argument. On occasion,
however, another member of the Court or the lawyer identifies the Justice when referring
back to his or her question.
179.
Id. at *6-*8, *27-*28.
180.
Id. at *42-*43 (asking whether Congress could overrule ProfessionalReal Estate
Investors).
181.
Id. at *11-*12 (questioning whether BE & K's argument would mean that "if
Congress passed a law adopting the English rule on... attorney's fees, [it] would be
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otherwise distinguishable from fee-shifting statutes.182 Others
asked for ways in which to distinguish the NLRA setting from
antitrust.8 The arguments concluded with a number of questions
that focused on the NLRB's actual practice in implementing the
Bill Johnson's holding over the past twenty years,8 especially in
determining whether an employer had a retaliatory motive.'8
B.

The BE & K Opinions

On June 24, 2002, the Court issued its decision. 86 BE & K
won. The Court was unanimous in its judgment that the NLRB
applied the wrong standard in finding BE & K in violation of the
NLRA' 8 7 All nine Justices agreed that the NLRB improperly
found retaliatory motive.'8 8 The Court thus avoided defining the
proper merit standard under the Petition Clause. Although the
issue is still open for debate and decision, the majority opinion,
by Justice O'Connor, and the two concurring opinions of Justice
Breyer and Justice Scalia, offer some intriguing discussion that
may impact future analysis of this difficult constitutional
question.
Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court, in
which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas joined. 9 Her majority opinion is difficult to follow. The
difficulty comes in large part from her pattern of starting a
discussion and setting up an issue, only to dismiss the discussion
and issue as not relevant to the question at hand. Yet, it is
through these distinguished questions that we can garner the
most insights into the majority's likely future approach to the
First Amendment merit standard.

unconstitutional").
182.
Id. at *12-*13, *39-*40 (noting that, for example, exposure to triple damages
constitutes a punishment that is different from fee-shifting).
183.
See id. at *12-*13, *16. This came from both directions. Some asked about the
burdens imposed by the NLRA, as opposed to those under antitrust. Id. at "12-*13, *20*21, *32-*35, *43-*44. Other questions asked about the special potential for abuse when
an employer sues employees for retaliatory purposes. Id. at *17; see also id. at *19 (stating
that the Court is "not concerned solely with chilling [the employer's petition right]; we're
also concerned with retaliation").
184. Id. at *14, *20-*23. The Court expressed its concern about the doctrine of stare
decisis, under which the Court holds that Congress has implicitly endorsed the Court's
interpretation of a federal statute when Congress does not act to reverse it. Id. at *22*23.
185.
Id. at *36-*39 and *44-*50.
186.
BE & K Constr. Co.v. NLRB, 122 S. Ct.2390 (2002).
187.
See id. at 2393, 2402.
188.
Id.
189.
Id. at 2393.
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Justice O'Connor started her opinion by tracing the history
of the petition right, creation of Noerr petitioning immunity, and
extension of Noerr immunity to judicial petitions.9 In doing so,
she set out the different merit standards in Professional Real
Estate Investors and Bill Johnson's.!" Importantly, Justice
O'Connor explained that the Bill Johnson's win-lose test for
completed litigation was dicta 19 2 and that the Court
"customar[ily] refus[ed] to be bound by dicta."'93 She thus turned
to "the question presented," which she characterized as "whether
the [NLRBI may impose liability for a retaliatory lawsuit that
was unsuccessful even if it was not objectively baseless."'94
In analyzing this question, Justice O'Connor first addressed
whether the difference between a finding of antitrust liability, on
the one hand, and NLRA illegality, on the other, justified the
greater protection of Professional Real Estate Investors.9 ' She
acknowledged the NLRB's arguments that antitrust suits impose
greater burdens than an NLRB proceeding, but she concluded that
these differences demonstrate at most that "an antitrust suit may
pose a greater burden on petitioning than the threat of an NLRA
adjudication" and that "[t]his does not mean the burdens posed by
the NLRA raise no First Amendment concerns."' 99 She explained
that the NLRA imposes burdens, even aside from an award of
attorneys' fees."' She expressly set aside the question of an order
that awarded attorneys' fees only.'99 Instead, a finding of illegality
under the NLRA itself imposes burdens, such as reputational harm,
that are sufficient to test the validity of the NLRA 9 9
190.
Id. at 2395-96.
191.
Id. at 2396-97.
192.
Id. at 2397 (noting that the issue in Bill Johnson's was whether the NLRB could
enjoin an ongoing suit and that "although [the Court's] statements [in Bill Johnson's]
regarding completed litigation were intended to guide further proceedings, [the Court] did
not expressly order the [NLRB] to adhere to its prior finding of unlawfulness under the
standard we stated").
193.
Id. at 2397-98 (citing U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 513
U.S. 18, 24 (1994)).
194.
Id. at 2398.
195.
Id.
196.
Id. (finding that, in addition to attorneys' fees, the "finding of illegality is a
burden by itself" that will result in additional legal consequences and danger of
reputational harm).
197.
Id.
198.
Id. ("Because we can resolve this case by looking only at the finding of illegality,
we need not decide whether the [NLRB]... has authority to award attorney's fees when a
suit is found to violate the NLRA."). Justice O'Connor noted that BE & K had sought
certiorari on the issue of whether the NLRB was authorized to assess attorneys' fees, but
that the Court did not grant review of this issue. Id. Accordingly, the Court looked to the
burden of NLRA liability, assuming no award of attorneys' fees. Id.
199.
Id. BE & K had argued in oral argument that these burdens included loss of
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This set up the First Amendment issue. Having identified
the burdens, Justice O'Connor moved on to discuss whether the
burdens impacted activity protected by the Petition Clause. °° She
returned to examining Bill Johnson's. There, she said the Court
recognized a First Amendment interest when it stopped the
NLRB from enjoining an ongoing suit.2 ' Justice O'Connor
analogized this concern to the prior restraint doctrine.0 2 The
analogy, however, did not answer the question at hand:
[T]his analogy at most suggests that injunctions may raise
greater First Amendment concerns, not that after-the-fact
penalties raise no concerns. Likewise, the fact that Bill
Johnson's allowed certain baseless suits to be enjoined tells
little about the propriety of
imposing penalties on various
202
classes of nonbaseless suits.
Justice O'Connor also analogized the issue to another First
Amendment doctrine-breathing room analysis. ' 4 As she noted,
Bill Johnson's cited Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.2"5 and compared
baseless suits to false statements under the Speech Clause.0 6
Justice O'Connor explained that under Gertz, the First
Amendment requires protection for some categories of false
speech so that true speech-"speech that matters"-has breathing
room and is better protected.0 ' Justice O'Connor explained that
both the Bill Johnson's test for ongoing litigation and the
ProfessionalReal Estate Investors test were "consistent" with this
breathing room doctrine, in that they did not punish all baseless
litigation.2 8 Instead, both cases imposed a subjective intent
work because entities, especially the government, would not hire contractors who were
found to be violators of the NLRA. See Official Transcript, supra note 112, at *12-*13.
200.
BE & K, 122 S. Ct. at 2398 ("Having identified this burden, we must examine
the petitioning activity it affects.").
201.
Id.
202.
Id. at 2399.
By analogy to other areas of First Amendment law, one might assume that
any concerns related to the right to petition must be greater when enjoining
ongoing litigation than when penalizing completed litigation. After all, the
First Amendment historically provides greater protection from prior
restraints than after-the-fact penalties ....

Id.
203.
Id.
204.
Id.
205.
See Bill Johnson's Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 743 (1983) ("Just as false
statements are not immunized by the First Amendment right to freedom of speech,
baseless litigation is not immunized by the First Amendment right to petition." (citations
omitted) (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 322, 341 (1974)). Gertz and potential
application of its breathing room analysis are discussed in Part III.A infra.
206.
BE & K, 122 S. Ct. at 2399.
207.
Id. (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341).
208.
See id. Justice O'Connor explained:
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limitation before liability could be imposed, even on a suit that
lacked objective merit. 9 In other words; some baseless suitsthose filed for a propler purpose-are protected under both tests.
Yet, again, this discussion did not answer the issue before
the Court. Justice O'Connor explained:
But we need not resolve whether objectively baseless
litigation requires any "breathing room" protection, for
what is at issue here are suits that are not baseless in the
first place. Instead, as an initial matter, we are dealing
with the class of reasonably based but unsuccessful
lawsuits. But whether this class of suits falls outside the
scope of the First Amendment's Petition Clause at the least
presents a difficult constitutional question, given the
following considerations.21 °
Before discussing Justice O'Connor's three "considerations," it is
important to understand the "difficult constitutional question"
that she was addressing. Although she did not say so explicitly, I
contend that Justice O'Connor was trying to determine which
side of the line losing but reasonable suits fall. Are they like
"baseless" suits and false statements, which warrant only
protection indirectly through breathing room analysis? Or, are
they closer to winning claims and true speech, which are within
the core right of the First Amendment and which warrant nearly
absolute protection under strict scrutiny review? This is the crux
of the First Amendment issue. Justice O'Connor was in essence
trying to set the standard for determining the lawsuits that fall
within the core right of the First Amendment, while
acknowledging that the breathing room doctrine still might
protect some suits that fall outside of this core right.
To answer this difficult constitutional question, Justice
O'Connor listed three considerations. First, she noted that some
losing suits present genuine grievances and that the text of the
Petition Clause is not limited to successful petitions.2 1' Second,
Justice O'Connor recognized that unsuccessful, but reasonable,
It is at least consistent with these "breathing space" principles that we have
never held that the entire class of objectively baseless litigation may be enjoined
or declared unlawful even though such suits may advance no First Amendment
interests of their own. Instead, in cases like Bill Johnson'sand ProfessionalReal
Estate Investors, our holdings limited regulation to suits that were both
objectively baseless and subjectively motivated by an unlawful purpose.

Id.
209.
See id.
210.
Id.
211.
Id. at 2399-2400 ("[TIhe text of the First Amendment... speaks simply of the
right of the people ... to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." (quotation
marks omitted)).
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suits advance some First Amendment issues, such as public
airing of disputes and raising matters of public concern,212
developing the law,"' and providing an alternative to violence. 14
As her final consideration, Justice O'Connor noted that the
analogy to false statements of fact is not perfect because "the fact
[that a suit] loses does not mean that it is false" but rather
means "[a]t most ... [that] the plaintiff did not meet its burden
of pro[ofl." 15 In listing the three factors, Justice O'Connor
seemingly suggested that losing but reasonable suits should fall
on the side of winning lawsuits, within the core right of the First
Amendment. All three arguments go to such protection. However,
she never decided this point. Instead, she shifted focus and
addressed the NLRB's finding of retaliatory motive.
Justice O'Connor made the transition by noting that the
NLRB does not penalize any suits unless they are filed for a
retaliatory purpose." 6 Therefore, she explained, the Court must
consider the "significance of that particular limitation."2 7 This is
where the majority opinion gets particularly difficult to follow.
Justice O'Connor started the discussion of motive by noting that
Bill Johnson's did not define "retaliatory" motive, but that the
NLRB had since interpreted retaliation to mean interference
with an employee's protected rights.2"8 Justice O'Connor said that
this definition was too broad.219 Her problem likely was not in use
212.
Id. at 2400 ("Like successful suits, unsuccessful suits allow the 'public airing of
disputed facts,' and raise matters of public concern." (citing Bill Johnson's Rests. v.
NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 743 (1983) (citation omitted))).
213.
Id. (observing that unsuccessful suits "also promote evolution of the law by
supporting the development of legal theories that may not gain acceptance the first time
around").
214.
Id. ("Moreover, the ability to lawfully prosecute even unsuccessful suits adds
legitimacy to the court system as a designated alternative to force." (citing Andrews,
Access to Court, supra note 7, at 656)).
215.
Id.
216.
Id. (noting that "the [NLRB] confines its penalties to unsuccessful suits brought
with a retaliatory motive").
217.
Id. Likely because this issue seems to be off track, Justice O'Connor noted that
motive was "fairly included" in the question presented in the Court's grant of certiorari,
which was "whether the [NLRB] 'may impose liability on an employer for filing a losing
retaliatory lawsuit, even if the employer could show the suit was not objectively baseless.'"
Id. (quoting BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 534 U.S. 1074 (2002) (mem.) (granting
certiorari)). This may seem a bit of a stretch, but it is the means by which the Court
ultimately avoided deciding the difficult constitutional question of whether reasonable but
losing suits are within the core right of the First Amendment. In actuality, this question
of motive could be a constitutional question-whether the motive limitation is alone an
adequate protection of the right to file suits or whether motive itself defines the right to
petition. Refer to notes 284-85 infra and accompanying text (discussing the role of motive
in defining First Amendment rights).
218. BE & K, 122 S. Ct. at 2400.
219.
Id. ("As we read it... the [NLRB's] definition broadly covers a substantial

2003]

AFTER BE & K

1335

of the term "interfere," because this is the statutory language of
the NLRA, which makes it illegal to "interfere with, restrain, or
coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in [the
NLRA] .220 Instead, Justice O'Connor's problem seemed to be the
way in which the NLRB found this interference.
The NLRB found motive in the BE & K case based in large
part on the fact that BE & K had lost its suit that challenged
protected activity. According to Justice O'Connor, a suit could
interfere with the unions' exercise of their statutory labor right
and yet be genuine:
As a practical matter, the filing of the suit may interfere
with or deter some employees' exercise of NLRA rights. Yet
the employer's motive may still reflect only a subjectively
genuine desire to test the legality of the conduct. Indeed, in
this very case, the [NLRB's] first basis for finding
retaliatory motive was the fact that [BE & K's] suit related
to protected conduct that [BE & K] believed was
unprotected. If such a belief is both subjectively genuine
and objectively reasonable, then declaring the resulting suit
illegal affects genuine petitioning.22 '
The second basis on which the NLRB found unlawful motive
was BE & K's anti-union animus. 22 Justice O'Connor had two
problems with this basis. First, she explained that ill will is to be
expected in litigation and that it does not mean that the plaintiff
does not honestly seek relief.223 Second, she noted that in the
context of First Amendment freedoms, the Court has been
reluctant to impose liability based on ill will alone, even when
the activity at issue, such as false speech, is outside the core
right of the First Amendment.2 24
Justice O'Connor concluded that "[i or these reasons," the
motive limitation as imposed by the NLRB does not make the
amount of genuine petitioning.").
220.
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2000). Refer to note 48 supra (quoting § 158(a)(1)).
221.
BE & K, 122 S. Ct. at 2400 (citation omitted).
222.
Id. (observing that the NLRB "claims to rely on evidence of antiunion animus to
infer retaliatory motive").
223.
Id. at 2400-01 ("[I]ll will is not uncommon in litigation.... But that does not
mean that such disputes are not genuine.").
224.
Id. at 2401. Refer to notes 322-25 infra (discussing Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988)). Justice O'Connor explained this First Amendment practice:
Even in other First Amendment contexts, we have found it problematic to
regulate some demonstrably false expression based on the presence of ill will.
For example, we invalidated a criminal statute prohibiting false statements
about public officials made with ill will. Indeed, the requirement that private
defamation plaintiffs prove the falsity of speech on matters of public concern
may indirectly shield much speech concealing ill motives.
BE & K, 122 S. Ct. at 2401 (citation omitted).
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difficult constitutional issue any easier, because the "limitation
fails to exclude a substantial amount of petitioning that is
objectively and subjectively genuine. ' Yet, in actuality, the
breadth with which the NLRB applied the motive standard did
make the constitutional question easier because it had the effect
of restating the question. In other words, Justice O'Connor
acknowledged that the question was no longer whether the
NLRB could punish reasonable suits that were truly retaliatory
in nature, as suggested in the Court's grant of certiorari, but
instead "whether a class of petitioning may be declared unlawful
when a substantial portion of it is subjectively and objectively
22 The latter question
genuine.""
seemingly would be easier to
answer than the former both on a constitutional level-because
the intrusion into exercise of First Amendment freedoms is
greater-and on a statutory level-because the NLRB is
punishing activity not necessarily within the congressional
prohibition. Thus, Justice O'Connor restated the question and
moved away from the original "difficult" question of defining the
merit standard.
Yet Justice O'Connor avoided answering even the new
question on a constitutional level. This she did expressly. She
noted that in a prior labor case the Court avoided a potential
conflict with the First Amendment by narrowly construing the
NLRA.22 ' Justice O'Connor then proceeded to similarly narrow
the NLRA so that it did not apply to BE & K's suit, at least not to
the factual findings relied upon by the NLRB:
Because there is nothing in the statutory text indicating
that [29 U.S.C.] § 158(a)(1) must be read to reach all
reasonably based but unsuccessful suits filed with a
retaliatory purpose, we decline to do so. Because the
[NLRB's] standard for imposing liability under the NLRA
225.
Id.
226.
Id.
227.
Id. Justice O'Connor stated:
In a prior labor law case, we avoided a similarly difficult First Amendment issue
by adopting a limiting construction of the relevant NLRA provision.... [Edward
J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building and Construction Trades
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)], we found that the statutory provisions and
their legislative history indicated no clear intent to reach the handbilling in
question, and so we simply read the statute not to cover it, thereby avoiding the
First Amendment question altogether.
Id. (citation omitted). In DeBartolo, unions peacefully distributed handbills outside a
mall, urging consumers to not shop at the stores until the mall owner agreed to use only
contractors paying fair wages. 485 U.S. 568, 570 (1988). The Court decided that the NLRA
did not reach such handbilling and thus avoided "deciding whether a congressional
prohibition of handbilling on the facts of [Debartolo] would violate the First Amendment."
Id. at 578.
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allows it to penalize such suits, its standard is thus
invalid.228
Her choice of words here is somewhat confusing. In the first
sentence she referred to "suits filed for a retaliatory purpose," but
as she explained just a few paragraphs earlier, her real problem
with the NLRB was that it punished suits, such as BE & K's suit,
that were not necessarily filed for an improper purpose.22 9 She did
not necessarily have a problem with the NLRB punishing suits
filed for a truly improper purpose, as she made clear in her next
sentence:
We do not decide whether the [NLRB] may declare
unlawful any unsuccessful but reasonably based suits that
would not have been filed but for a motive to impose the
costs of the litigationprocess, regardless of outcome, in
retaliationfor NLRA protected activity, since2 0the [NLRB's]
standard does not confine itself to such suits.
Thus, the narrow holding of the case is that the NLRB
improperly interpreted the NLRA in order to punish suits that
might have been filed for the legitimate purpose of challenging
behavior that the employer genuinely believed to be illegal. This
leaves many questions open. One, as stated above, is whether the
NLRA can punish reasonable but losing suits that were filed for
purposes other than seeking relief.231 Justice O'Connor also
explained that the Court's holding did not impact other litigation
penalties:
[NIothing in our holding today should be read to question
the validity of common litigation sanctions imposed by
courts themselves-such as those authorized under Rule
11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-or the validity
of statutory provisions that merely authorize
the
22
imposition of attorney's fees on a losing plaintiff.
Thus, by sidestepping the "difficult constitutional question," the
Court preserved, at least for a time, most other litigation
penalties.
All nine Justices agreed with the narrow ground of decision:
the NLRB had improperly found retaliatory motive under the

228.
BE & K, 122 S. Ct. at 2402.
229.
Id. at 2401-02 (finding that "the [NLRB's] standard for imposing liability under
the NLRA allows it to penalize" reasonably based suits).
230.
Id. at 2402 (emphasis added).
231.
As to motive, the Court also reserved decision on any further meaning of the
term "retaliation." Id. ("[We need not decide what our dicta in Bill Johnson's may have
meant by 'retaliation."').
232.
Id.
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statute in this case."' However, Justice Breyer, in a concurring
opinion, in which Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg joined,
took issue with the majority opinion. Justice Breyer agreed that
the NLRB's finding of motive inappropriately suggested "that
losing a lawsuit against a union, in and of itself, virtually alone,
shows retaliation."" 4 Justice Breyer would have limited the
discussion to that narrow ground." 5 He objected to the majority's
characterization of the Bill Johnson's win-lose test as dicta.236
Justice Breyer observed that any such discussion by the majority
was itself dicta,"' but he nonetheless expressed concern that "the
23
Court's opinion might suggest a more far-reaching rule.""
The more far-reaching rule about which Justice Breyer was
concerned was application of the Professional Real Estate
Investors objective merit standard to test the legality of
completed suits under the NLRA. Justice Breyer did not
expressly address the constitutional question of the standard
required by the First Amendment. He instead discussed
differences in statutory policy and history that distinguish the
NLRA setting from antitrust. 239 Nevertheless, by making these
policy arguments, he implicitly argued that Bill Johnson's set the
constitutional standard. If ProfessionalReal Estate Investors set
the First Amendment standard, the NLRA could not punish
losing but meritorious suits, no matter any differences in
statutory history and policy.
In discussing the differences between labor and antitrust,
Justice Breyer first repeated the arguments, raised by the NLRB
and noted by the majority, that the threat of potential antitrust
liability has a far more chilling effect on filing suit than the
potential threat of NLRA liability. 2 ° But Justice Breyer added
233.
See id. at 2402-04.
234.
Id. at 2404 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
235.
See id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("Insofar
as language in the Court's opinion might suggest a more far-reaching rule, I do not agree."
(citation omitted)).
236.
Id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("The courts,
the [NLRBI, the bar, employers, and unions alike have treated the Court's discussion of
completed lawsuits in Bill Johnson's as a holding and have followed it for 20 years.").
237.
Id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("I can find
no good reason to characterize the statements in Bill Johnson's as dicta-though I
recognize that the Court's language so characterizing Bill Johnson's is itself dicta.").
238.
Id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
239.
See id. at 2404-06 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (explaining why he "do[es] not believe that this Court's antitrust precedent
determines the outcome here").
240.
Id. at 2404-05 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(noting that applying antitrust law threatens the defendant with treble damages and high
court-defense costs).
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that there were "[o]ther differences, those related to scope,
purpose, and history, [that] are major and determinative."24'
These other differences boil down to the relative role of abusive
lawsuits in the two statutory schemes. Justice Breyer argued
that abusive lawsuits "occupy but one tiny corner of the
anticompetitive-activity universe," but that abusive lawsuits
against employees and unions constituted "much of [the NLRA's]
historical reason for being."42 He recounted the history of the
federal labor laws24 and concluded by saying: "[t]he upshot is
that an employer's antiunion lawsuit occupies a position far
closer to the heart of the labor law than does a defendant's
anticompetitive lawsuit in respect to antitrust law. And that fact
makes all the difference." 244 Given this history, he concluded that

the antitrust doctrine of ProfessionalReal Estate Investors has no
application to the NLRA; Bill Johnson's correctly set the
standard for NLRA liability; and the majority should not have
suggested, albeit in dicta, that the issue was open.245
Justice Scalia filed a concurring opinion in which Justice
Thomas joined.
Justice Scalia had no objection to Justice
O'Connor's discussion or holding. Instead, he took issue with
Justice Breyer's concurrence. Justice Scalia agreed with Justice
Breyer that the implication of the majority opinion is that the
Court in the future will construe the NLRA to require application
of the Professional Real Estate Investors objective standard.247
241.
Id. at 2405 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
242.
Id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
243.
Id. at 2405-06 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Justice Breyer reported that courts in the nineteenth century were particularly hostile to
unions and held unions to be criminal conspiracies, granted injunctions against unions,
and broadly interpreted statutes to regulate union activity. Id. at 2405 (Breyer, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). He claimed that the labor laws were
designed in large part to counter this judicial hostility toward unions. Id. at 2405-06
(Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
244.
Id. at 2406 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
245.
Id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice
Breyer concluded:
I do not know why the Court reopens these matters in its opinion today. But I
note that it has done so only to leave them open. It does not, in the end, decide
them. On that understanding, but only to the extent that I describe at the
outset, I join in the Court's opinion.
Id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted).
246.
Id. at 2403 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I am able ... to join the Court's opinion in
full ....
").
247.
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
I agree with Justice Breyer that the implication of our decision today is
that, in a future appropriate case, we will construe the [NLRA] in the same
way we have already construed the Sherman Act: to prohibit only lawsuits
that are both objectively baseless and subjectively intended to abuse
process.
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Unlike Justice Breyer, Justice Scalia presumably endorsed this
result. Justice Scalia, however, did not necessarily agree that the
Professional Real Estate Investors test was required in all
contexts.248 Instead, he isolated one factor in labor cases that
mandated the extra protection of Professional Real Estate
Investors-the fact that a federal agency, rather than a court,
made the factual findings necessary for imposing liability under
the NLRA 49
Justice Scalia claimed that Justice Breyer overlooked one
difference between labor and antitrust that "suggests-indeed,
demands-precisely the opposite conclusion" of that argued by
Justice Breyer.2 50 According to Justice Scalia, the fact that in the
labor context the NLRB, rather than an Article III federal court,
determines whether a reasonably based lawsuit will be punished
"undermines" Justice Breyer's analysis. 2 1 "At the very least,"
Justice Scalia argued, this difference poses
a difficult question under the First Amendment: whether
an executive agency can be given the power to punish a
reasonably based suit filed in an Article III court
whenever it concludes-insulated from de novo judicial
review by the substantial evidence standard [of the
25
NLRA]IM-that
the complainant had one motive rather
than another."3
He continued that "[i]t would be extraordinary to interpret a
statute which is silent on this subject to intrude upon the courts'
ability to decide for themselves which postulants for their
assistance should be punished."" 4 Accordingly, Justice Scalia
agreed that the majority correctly limited its holding so as not to
255
invalidate litigation sanctions "imposed by courts themselves."
Justice Scalia thus recognized a constitutional dimension to the
problem, but centered the First Amendment concern on the

Id. at 2402 (Scalia, J., concurring).
248.
See id. at 2402-03 (Scalia, J., concurring) (finding that the complainant may
have more First Amendment rights to file a lawsuit under the NLRA).
249.
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that under the NLRA an executive based
agency, the NLRB, "determines whether a litigant will be punished for filing an
objectively reasonable lawsuit").
250.
Id. at 2402 (Scalia, J., concurring).
251.
Id. at 2402-03 (Scalia, J., concurring). This issue was not raised by the parties,
but instead by one of the Justices in oral argument; most probably Justice Scalia raised
this concern. See Official Transcript, supra note 112, at *29-*32.
252.
The NLRA requires that courts review findings of fact made by the NLRB under
the "substantial evidence" standard. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (2000).
253.
BE & K, 122 S. Ct. at 2403 (Scalia, J., concurring).
254.
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
255.
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted).
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"new" issue of the entity that makes the finding of fact, not on
the merit standard.
In sum, despite suggesting otherwise in its grant of
certiorari, the Court did not determine the proper standard for
determining merit under the Petition Clause right of court
access. The Court's three opinions skirt around the issue, but
they never resolve it. Thus, we must wait for what Justice Scalia
called the "future appropriate case"256 to learn the Court's
resolution to the "difficult constitutional question." In the
meantime, however, this Article proposes a framework by which
the Court should approach and answer the question.
III. A PROPOSAL FOR DEFINING AND PROTECTING
MERITORIOUS LAWSUITS UNDER THE PETITION CLAUSE

My proposed framework for protecting civil suits under the
First Amendment has two basic levels. The first is definition of
the narrow right of court, access that is at the core of the Petition
Clause. I contend that this narrow right includes only winning
claims. The second level is protection of the core right. I propose
that the protection should consist of strict scrutiny for lawsuits
within the core right and breathing room analysis for suits at the
periphery of the core right, such as losing but' reasonable suits.
This is the proposal that I have put forth in previous articles.
Here, I briefly repeat the proposal, but in a slightly different
order. I start by stating the basic elements of my suggested
analysis, as I have done in my previous articles, without
factoring in the BE & K decision. In Part A, I give a broad
overview of my proposed breathing room analysis framework. In
Part B, I focus on the fundamental issue of setting the proper
merit standard for determining the suits that are within the core
right to petition courts. The proper definition of the core right is
pivotal because the level of protection-strict scrutiny or
breathing room analysis-turns on whether a suit is within or
outside the core First Amendment right.
In Part C, I conclude by analyzing my proposal in light of the
BE & K decision. The BE & K Court did not adopt any particular
framework for analysis. Indeed, its discussion of the
constitutional question was dicta, and the Justices had
differences of opinion. Yet, I contend that my proposed form of
analysis is at least consistent with much of the discussion in the
three BE & K opinions and, more importantly, it is the best, if
not only, means to address the concerns of the Court. Narrow
256.

Refer to note 247 supra (quoting Justice Scalia's concurrence in BE & K).
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definition of the core right to petition courts to include only
winning claims, combined with breathing room protection for
other meritorious suits, is the most likely means by which the
Court can retain some flexibility to both protect litigants' rights
and curb extreme cases of abuse.
A.

The GeneralApproach

I borrow and adapt my suggested analysis from the Court's
speech jurisprudence. Although the Court has not yet formally
adopted a particular scheme of analysis under the Petition
Clause, it has suggested use of its Speech Clause methodology. In
1945, the Court declared that the rights of petition, speech, and
press, "though not identical, are inseparable" 5 7 and demand more
protection than other rights."' In NAACP v. Button,5 9 the Court
explained that this greater protection would require "strict
scrutiny" review.26 ° Under strict scrutiny, the government must
have a compelling interest to regulate the right at issue, and it
must narrowly tailor its regulation to meet that purpose.261 That
257.
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945). The Court explained the
relationship between petition and speech:
It was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom in speech and
press were coupled in a single guaranty with the rights of the people peaceably
to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances. All these, though not
identical, are inseparable. They are cognate rights, and therefore united in the
First Article's assurance.
Id. (citation omitted).
258.
Id. The Thomas Court further explained the special place of First Amendment
freedoms:
[T]he preferred place given in our scheme to the great, the indispensable
democratic freedoms secured by the First Amendment .... gives these liberties a
sanctity and a sanction not permitting dubious intrusions. And it is the
character of the right, not of the limitation, which determines what standards
governs the choice.
For these reasons, any attempt to restrict those liberties must be justified
by clear public interest, threatened not doubtfully or remotely, but by clear and
present danger. The rational connection between the remedy provided and the
evil to be curbed, which in other contexts might support legislation against
attack on due process grounds, will not suffice. These rights rest on firmer
foundation.... Only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give
occasion for permissible limitation. It is therefore in our tradition to allow the
widest room for discussion, the narrowest range for its restriction, particularly
when this right is exercised in conjunction with peaceable assembly.
Id. (citations and footnote omitted).
259.
371 U.S. 415 (1963).
260.
Id. at 438. In Button, the Court noted that its "decisions ... have consistently
held that only a compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's
constitutional power to regulate can justify limiting First Amendment freedoms." Id.
261.
This special protection, as the Thomas Court noted, is more protective than that
applicable to other constitutional rights, such as due process. Refer to note 258 supra. Due
process requires only that the state reasonably aim its regulation to achieve a legitimate
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the petition right is analogous to speech and protected by strict
scrutiny, however, does not end the problem of determining the
proper way to protect the right to petition courts. There are
innumerable specialized doctrines, tests, and categories
applicable in speech cases, and these standards seem to be in
constant flux. 2 2 In proposing my framework for the petition right
of court access, I keep the analysis relatively simple by adapting
one of the Court's better known speech doctrines, the New York
Times analysis.
Under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,262 courts take a twostep approach to protect speech in the defamation context. First,
they characterize the speech at issue as being outside or within
the core right of free expression. False speech is not part of the
core right, while true statements of fact and opinion are within
the core right.
In the second step, the courts determine what
type of protection is due the different categories of speech. Speech
within the core right gets nearly absolute protection under strict
scrutiny review.2 5
state object. See Jones v. Union Guano Co., 264 U.S. 171, 181 (1924) (holding that a court
will not invalidate a precondition to filing suit under due process if "the condition imposed
has a reasonablerelation to a legitimate object" (emphases added)).
262.
See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). Members of the Court
disagreed as to whether strict scrutiny applied to a hate speech ordinance that regulated
"fighting words," a category of speech not traditionally considered to be within the core
right of protected speech. Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, characterized the
ordinance as one invoking viewpoint and mandating strict scrutiny. Id. at 395-96. Justice
White argued that fighting words warranted no protection. Id. at 399-400 (White, J.,
concurring in the judgment) ("This Court's decisions have plainly stated that expression
falling within certain limited categories so lacks the values the First Amendment was
designed to protect that the Constitution affords no protection to that expression.").
Likewise, in recent cable access cases, members of the Court have disagreed as to the
proper standard of review. See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v.
FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 786 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (criticizing the plurality opinion for not applying
strict scrutiny despite its use of "synonyms" for strict scrutiny); see also Simon &
Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 124-28
(1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the strict scrutiny
standard found its way into First Amendment jurisprudence "by accident").
263. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
264.
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (stating that "there is
no constitutional value in false statements of fact"). See generally 2 SMOLLA, FREEDOM OF
SPEECH, supra note 25, §§ 23.6-10, at 23-38 to 23-40.5 (discussing the different
categories of speech in the defamation context, including false statements of fact, true
statements, and opinions).
265. The Court has suggested, but has not unequivocally held, that all true speech is
absolutely immune from civil liability, regardless of the motive of the speaker. This has
been particularly evident in the defamation context. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (extending the doctrine to public figures and to civil liability
other than defamation); Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 778, 779 & n.4
(1986) (holding that the First Amendment required a private figure plaintiff to prove the
falsity of the statement-as opposed to placing the burden of proof and risk of doubt on
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The primary focus of the New York Times line of cases,
however, is the protection due false speech, which falls outside of
the core right. It is protected only to the extent necessary to
protect the speech within the core right, through a form of
breathing room. In New York Times, the Court gave true speech
breathing space through the actual malice standard: a court may
not award civil damages for false and defamatory speech about
public officials or public figures unless the plaintiff can prove, by
clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant spoke with
actual knowledge or reckless disregard for the falsity of the
statement.2 66 In other words, to protect true speech about
important issues, the Court protected some forms of false
speech-negligent
false speech about public officials-from
2 67
liability.
Breathing room analysis provides less protection than strict
scrutiny. It is a form of reasonable analysis. The particular type
of protection due each utterance depends upon the relative
interests at stake and requires a balancing of interests. For
example, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Court did not give the
protection of the New York Times actual malice standard to
speakers who defamed private persons, as opposed to public
figures, even as to speech that addressed matters of public
concern.268 Although the possibility of damages still would chill
speech in this context, the Gertz Court allowed the chilling effect
because speech about private persons is not as central to the
First Amendment as speech about public figures, and because the
state interest in protecting a private person is greater than that
the speaker-at least where the defendant is a member of the media and the speech is of
public concern); Garrison v. Louisiana, 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (holding that the First
Amendment barred criminal sanctions against a speaker whose statements about a public
official were true but spoken with ill will). In other contexts, the Court has allowed some
regulation of true speech. The Court, for example, allows reasonable regulation of the
time, place, and manner of commercial speech and speech in private fora. These doctrines
reflect at least the spirit of strict scrutiny in that they tolerate very little regulation of
true speech, the core right under the Speech Clause. See generally 1 SMOLLA, FREEDOM OF
SPEECH, supra note 25, §§ 2.01-.08, at 2-2 to 2-72 (providing an overview of free speech
methodology and noting that the term "heightened scrutiny" describes the Court's
approach in most speech cases).
266.
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). The Court thus gave
the speech at issue two forms of breathing room: the actual malice standard and the
higher clear and convincing evidence burden of proof. Id. at 279-80, 285-86 (finding that
"the proof presented to show actual malice lacks the convincing clarity which the
constitutional standard demands").
267.
See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342 ("[W]e have been especially anxious to assure to the
freedoms of speech and press that 'breathing space' essential to their fruitful exercise. To
that end this Court has extended a measure of strategic protection to defamatory
falsehood." (citation omitted)).
268.
Id. at 342-43.
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in protecting public officials who can protect themselves. 6 ' This,
however, did not mean that this type of speech was totally
unprotected. The Gertz Court extended a more limited form of
breathing room to the speech at issue by forbidding presumed or
punitive damages, which have a particularly chilling effect.270
Under this breathing room approach, the Court first looks at
each form of governmental penalty or restriction and determines
the chilling effect, if any, on utterance of true speech. To
determine whether the chilling effect is undue, the Court
balances the governmental interests behind the restriction
against the First Amendment interests implicated by the
particular type of speech. Thus, in the defamation context, the
Court distinguishes between different types of plaintiffs,
different standards for liability, different forms of damages, and
different types of speech. This individualized review, however, is
a restriction-by-restriction, rather than case-by-case, approach.
269.
Id. at 322-47. The Gertz Court explained the different interests presented by a
private plaintiff:
[We have no difficulty in distinguishing among defamation plaintiffs. The first
remedy of any victim of defamation is self-help-using available opportunities to
contradict the lie or correct the error and thereby to minimize its adverse impact
on reputation. Public officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly
greater access to the channels of effective communication and hence have a more
realistic opportunity to counteract false statements than private individuals
normally enjoy. Private individuals are therefore more vulnerable to injury, and
the state interest in protecting them is correspondingly greater.
[Public officials and public figures also assume some of the risk of
defamation]. No such assumption is justified with respect to a [pr]ivate
individual. He has not accepted public office or assumed an influential role in
ordering society ....
Thus, private individuals are not only more vulnerable to
injury than public officials and public figures; they are also more deserving of
recovery.
For these reasons we conclude that the States should retain substantial
latitude in their efforts to enforce a legal remedy for defamatory falsehood
injurious to the reputation of a private individual.
Id. at 344-46 (quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted).
270.
Id. at 348-50. The Gertz Court explained the problem with punitive damages:
The largely uncontrolled discretion of juries to award damages where there is no
loss unnecessarily compounds the potential of any system of liability for
defamatory falsehood to inhibit the vigorous exercise of First Amendment
freedoms.... More to the point, the States have no substantial interest in
securing for plaintiffs such as this petitioner gratuitous awards of money
damages far in excess of any actual injury.
Id. at 349. The Court later refined this aspect of breathing room by distinguishing Gertz
as involving speech of public concern and holding that presumed and punitive damages
could be awarded if the speech concerned purely private matters and persons. See Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760-71 (1985) ("In light of the
reduced constitutional value of speech involving no matters of public concern, we hold
that the state interest adequately supports awards of presumed and punitive damageseven absent a showing of actual malice.").

1346

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[39:5

As the Court in Gertz warned, a case-by-case approach might
itself unduly chill speech.27 '
Other speech doctrines, outside of the defamation context,
also address possible chilling effects. The prior restraint rule, for
example, requires courts to critically examine injunctions,2 2 even
those issued against utterance of false speech, because
injunctions stop speech rather than merely deter it. 27 3 The
vagueness doctrine has a similar aim. Under this doctrine, a
statute is invalid if it chills exercise of lawful speech by not
clearly distinguishing between lawful and unlawful speech.27 4
Finally, the overbreadth doctrine invalidates laws that chill
speech by reaching too broadly and restricting both protected and
unprotected speech.
I propose, as I have in my previous work, that the Court use
these basic doctrines to protect the right to petition courts. First,
the Court should set a standard for determining the civil suits
that address the core right of the First Amendment Petition
Clause. Second, the Court should protect the core right by
extending it some breathing room through protection of other
lawsuits on the periphery of the core right.27 ' The Court already
271.
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343-44 (noting that "[t]heoretically... the balance between
the needs of the press and the individual's claim.., might be struck on a case-by-case
basis" but that "this approach would lead to unpredictable results and uncertain
expectations").
272.
Prior restraints usually take the form of an injunction, but other regulations can
have the same effect. See Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130
(1992) (noting that an "ordinance requiring a permit and a fee before authorizing public
speaking, parades, or assemblies in 'the archetype of a traditional public forum' is a prior
restraint on speech" (citation omitted)).
273.
Refer to notes 200-03 supra (discussing Justice O'Connor's analogy to prior
restraint doctrine in BE & K).
274.
Vagueness is a due process concern as to all statutes. See Connally v. Gen.
Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) ("[A] statute which either forbids or requires the
doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of
law."). When applied to First Amendment freedoms, however, the doctrine is even more
exacting. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963) (discussing the "narrow
specificity" with which statutes regulating First Amendment freedoms must be drawn).
275.
Not just any potential improper application will invalidate a statute that
otherwise properly reaches activity within the police power of government. The test is
whether the statute substantially burdens protected activity. See Gentile v. State Bar,
501 U.S. 1030, 1077 (1991) ("The 'overbreadth' doctrine applies if an enactment 'prohibits
constitutionally protected conduct.' To be unconstitutional, overbreadth must be
'substantial.'" (citations omitted)); see also Button, 371 U.S. at 432 ("[Iln appraising a
statute's inhibiting effect upon [First Amendment] rights, this Court has not hesitated to
take into account possible applications of the statute in other factual contexts besides that
at bar.").
276.
I also propose other limitations on the core right other than the winning claim
definition. For example, I have argued that the core right to petition courts extends only
to the initial filing of the suit and not to either preparation of the claim before filing or
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has hinted at this general approach for Petition Clause cases. In
McDonald v. Smith, the Court applied the New York Times
breathing room doctrine to allegedly defamatory executive
petitions.277 In Button, the Court recognized that the NAACP
27 In Bill Johnson's,
litigation activity needed "breathing space.""
the Court cited Gertz and held that baseless suits were not part
of the core right to petition courts. 2 9 Although the Court there
did not use the terms "breathing room" or "prior restraint," it
implied such when it stated the two tests of merit-one
applicable to ongoing suits and the other to completed
litigation.
B. The Core PetitionRight to File Only Winning Claims
This leaves the important question of how to define the core
right. I argue that the core right to petition courts extends only to
winning claims. I fully acknowledge that this definition seems
counter-intuitive. But, as I hope to demonstrate, it is not an
unreasonable definition of the core right. There are some textual
and historical bases for the narrow definition. More importantly,
the narrow definition achieves the best balance of policy. It gives
courts flexibility so that they can preserve a citizen's right to go to

processing of the claim once it is filed. See Andrews, Access to Court, supra note 7, at 63348. Yet, I have argued that the breathing room doctrine would protect some of this other
activity so as not to chill the core right to file the claim. See Andrews, Politically
Motivated Suits, supra note 7, at 70-74, 90-93; see also Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League
Baseball Players Ass'n, 208 F.3d 885, 896-99 (10th Cir. 2000) (Lucero, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the breathing room doctrine required some protection of pre-litigation
threat letters between private parties).
277.
McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring).
Refer to notes 54-56, 60 supra and accompanying text (discussing the Court's view of
statements in a petition to the executive as being in the same light as those made to any
other public figure).
278.
Button, 371 U.S. at 432-33. Button warned that statutes touching on First
Amendment rights, including the right to petition, must be drawn with "narrow
specificity":
[S]tandards of permissible statutory vagueness are strict in the area of free
expression.... [T]he danger [is] tolerating, in the area of First Amendment
freedoms, the existence of a penal statute susceptible of sweeping and improper
application. These freedoms are delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely
precious in our society. The threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost
as potently as the actual application of sanctions. Because First Amendment
freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area
only with narrow specificity.
Id. (citations and footnote omitted).
279.
Refer to notes 203-09 supra (discussing the Court's treatment of baseless
litigation under the First Amendment).
280.
Refer to notes 80-85 supra and accompanying text (comparing the test
applicable to ongoing suits with the test applicable to completed litigation).
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court, on the one hand, and curb extreme cases of abuse, on the
other.
Before I discuss the win-lose and objective tests of merit, I
must address two preliminary questions. The first is whether any
form of merit standard is warranted under the Petition Clause.
After all, one could argue that the First Amendment protects all
petitions, including frivolous complaints, regardless of their
merit. I do not agree. Some form of merit standard is inherent in
the petition right, at least as it applies to courts, for several
reasons. First, the Petition Clause speaks of petitions "for redress
of grievances." 81 A frivolous complaint arguably is not one "for
redress." The Court has similarly limited other First Amendment
rights even where the text is not as amenable to a narrow
reading as is the Petition Clause. The Court, for example,
excludes false speech from the core First Amendment right, even
though the text broadly guarantees "freedom of speech."282
The Court also looks to history and policy to define
constitutional rights. Courts historically have limited access based
on the merit of the claim. Long before the Framers drafted the First
Amendment, courts sought to bar or punish false pleadings and
groundless suits.283 The judicial hostility toward frivolous
complaints has several sound policy bases. The defendant suffers
needless reputation injury and financial loss when forced to defend
meritless suits. This harm is particularly troublesome because the
government participates in inflicting the harm by requiring the
defendant to come to court. Moreover, baseless filings harm the very
court system that is at the heart of the Petition Clause freedom.
Taxpayer dollars are wasted on the judicial processing of frivolous
claims. More significantly, frivolous suits could overwhelm the
courts so that other citizens, with reasonable claims, could be
denied access to justice. Thus, the Petition Clause's right of court
access itself is threatened when courts tolerate frivolous claims.

281.
Refer to note 1 supra (quoting the First Amendment).
Refer to notes 264 supra, 296-97 infra, and accompanying text (discussing the
282.
Court's exclusion of false speech from the core right).
283.
See generally Andrews, Motive Restrictions, supra note 7, at 692-704 (discussing
the history of restrictions on court access). As discussed below, however, most early
governmental restrictions were tied to whether the suit was won or lost, not merely
whether the suit was groundless. Refer to notes 287-94 infra and accompanying text
(describing various historical punishments for false pleadings and groundless suits); see
also D. Michael Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some "Striking"
Problems with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1, 17-19 (1977)
(noting that the "fines and amercements system reflects the common law's failure to
distinguish falsity and dishonesty in a very sophisticated manner" and that as a result,
the "losing party to a lawsuit had to pay a sum of money to the king for having been in the

wrong before the king's court").
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A second preliminary question is whether the plaintiffs
motive itself might define and limit the scope of the right to
petition. In other words, if the plaintiff has an improper motive,
is he nevertheless filing a petition "for redress of grievances"
within the meaning of the Petition Clause? In my previous
articles, I answer yes to this question and address the textual,
policy, and historical arguments at length.284 Here, I note only the
compelling policy reasons for not using motive to define the First
Amendment right. As frequently noted by the Supreme Court,
most petitions are accompanied by some selfish or other "less
than ideal" motive." 5 This is particularly true with civil
complaints. Most plaintiffs bear ill feelings toward the defendant.
Indeed, one of the policy bases for extending the right to petition
to the courts-providing an alternative to force-assumes such
hostility.
More importantly, use of motive to limit the right to petition
courts threatens the freedom of thought inherent in the First
Amendment. The propriety of a particular motive tends to
change with community views. For example, society today might
think well of a plaintiff who wants to destroy the Ku Klux Klan
or the big tobacco companies through litigation, but it is not
difficult to imagine a different societal view only a few decades
ago. The availability of courts should not turn on political mood
swings. A plaintiffs bad motive in filing a civil action, by itself,
should not take the claim outside the First Amendment. Instead,
the definition should turn on the merit of plaintiffs claims.
This leaves the question at hand, which is setting the proper
merit standard. As I have stated, I suggest that the Court adopt
a winning claim standard for defining the core right to petition
courts. I have previously argued that this is the constitutional
2 86 but that
standard set by the Court in Bill Johnson's,
point may
284.
See Andrews, Motive Restrictions, supra note 7, at 668-69; Andrews,
ProfessionalRules of Conduct, supra note 7, at 13-26.
285.
See E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127,
139 (1961). For example, the Court in Noerr stated:
The right of the people to inform their . . . government of their desires with
respect to the passage or enforcement of laws cannot properly be made to depend
upon their intent in doing so. It is neither unusual nor illegal for people to seek
action on laws in the hope that they may bring about an advantage to
themselves and a disadvantage to their competitors ....
A construction of the
Sherman Act that would disqualify people from taking a public position on
matters in which they are financially interested would thus deprive the
government of a valuable source of information and, at the same time, deprive
the people of their right to petition in the very instances in which that right may
be of the most importance to them.
Id.
286.
See Andrews, Access to Court, supra note 7, at 648-52; Andrews, Motive
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be irrelevant now in light of the Court's seeming willingness to
reopen the issue in BE & K. However, there are several
independent arguments why only winning claims should be
within the core right to petition courts.
The textual argument is the weakest. The Petition Clause's
reference to "grievances" would seem to include both successful
and unsuccessful petitions, so long as they are not frivolous. Yet,
one also might argue that because the text speaks of "redress," it
is limited to winning claims. Winning suits are the only petitions
that get redress. I do not think that this textual argument alone
is sufficiently persuasive to define the core right, but it at least
suggests some ambiguity in the Petition Clause, thereby making
the historical and policy arguments more determinative.
The historical arguments are stronger. This may come as a
surprise to modern observers, but plaintiffs in the AngloAmerican judicial system have long paid penalties, sometimes
severe, when they have lost civil suits. In early English history, a
loss was deemed the equivalent of a false swearing, and a losing
plaintiff paid with his tongue.287 Although English courts
lightened the punishment to a form of fine paid to the King, they
continued to burden plaintiffs with financial penalties for losing
their suits.2 8 Eventually the payment was made to the winning
Restrictions, supra note 7, at 684-87; Andrews, PoliticallyMotivated Suits, supra note 7,
at 60-65.
287.
Pollack and Maitland explain that a losing suit was considered "an aggravated
form of defamation," a wrong about "which ancient law speaks fiercely" and for which a
man, before the Conquest, "might lose his tongue." 2 FREDERICK POLLACK & FREDERICK
WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 539
(2d ed. 1952).
288.
See William C. Campbell, Comment, Groundless Litigation and the Malicious
ProsecutionDebate: A HistoricalAnalysis, 88 YALE L.J. 1218, 1221-22 (1979). The early
English practice evolved from payment with the plaintiffs tongue to payment of
"amercement":
Anglo-Saxon courts employed a simple system for guarding against false
suits: the complainant unfortunate enough to lose his cause also lost his tongue,
or, if that option proved distasteful, was compelled to pay his opponent
compensation, called wer, which was fixed according to the complainant's status.
Each complainant was required to provide sureties ....
The system of taxing fixed wer in response to false suits did not long
survive the Norman conquest. It gave way to a new and more flexible system
that evolved from Norman traditions-amercement.
The amercement system did not exact a previously fixed penalty from the
losing plaintiff and in strict theory was not automatically applied to every case.
In practice, however, immediately following the determination of the underlying
suit, judges found virtually all losing plaintiffs to be in the King's mercy for a
false claim. Liability then attached for some monetary penalty, which was
assessed or "affeered" by honest men of the neighborhood. Once the penalty had
been ascertained, the losing plaintiff or his pledges would pay it to the court.
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party, as opposed to the crown, to reimburse the winner for his
costs of suit. 89 This cost-shifting, today called the "English rule,"
applies to both losing defendants and losing plaintiffs and
includes attorneys' fees.
American courts today do not usually make the loser pay the
winner's attorneys' fees, but this "American rule" is a relatively
modern trend. 9 ' The concept of distinguishing between winning
and losing claims, for purposes of assessing penalties, was a
common practice at the time the Framers protected the petition
right. The American colonies imposed costs, including attorneys'
fees, on losing plaintiffs. 92 Historical evidence also suggests that

Id. (footnotes omitted).
289.
See 4 W. S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 536-37 (1924). Professor
Holdsworth describes how England moved to cost statutes under which the losing party
reimbursed the winning party for its litigation expenses, as opposed to paying a fine to
the King:
[T]hough from an early date the Chancellor in the exercise of his equitable
jurisdiction, had assumed the fullest power to order the defeated party to pay
costs, it was only by degrees that the principle made its way into the common
law. The amercement of the vanquished party was perhaps considered a
sufficient punishment. But a payment to the king or lord was not much
satisfaction to the successful party; and so, side by side with the amercement, we
get the gradual growth of the rule that the vanquished party must pay costs. The
amercement gradually became merely formal, and finally disappeared; but the
law about costs has increased in bulk and complexity from the thirteenth
century onwards.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
290.
See Arthur L. Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 853 (1929).
The law giving costs to the successful defendant developed more slowly than that
which gave costs to the plaintiff.... In 1607 the final step was taken when it
was provided that a defendant might recover costs in all cases in which the
plaintiff would have had them if he had recovered.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also id. at 861 (noting that an award of costs after 1875 often
included consideration of motive but that in previous statutes "costs must follow the
event" of the loss).
291.
In 1796, the Supreme Court announced what would become the "American
rule." See Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. 306, 306 (1796) ("The general practice of the
United States is in opposition to it; and even if that practice were not strictly correct in
principle, it is entitled to the respect of the court, till it is changed, or modified, by

statute.").
292.
The origin of the American rule is attributed to colonial hostility toward
lawyers. John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rules on Attorney Fee
Recovery, 47 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 11 (1984). Lawyers originally collected most of
their fees from the vanquished party, and colonial legislatures set fee schedules to limit
how much attorneys could recover from the losing party. Id. at 10-11. Professor Leubsdorf
explains this history:
During much of the eighteenth century, virtually all the colonies tried to
regulate fees by statute. To be effective, such legislation had to prescribe both
the fees a lawyer could charge his client and those that could be recovered from a
defeated adversary. The laws governing attorney fee awards, in other words,
served less as a way to shift or not shift fees from one party to another than as a
way to limit the amount of those fees. Once the fee was set, it was taken for
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colonial legislatures likewise imposed costs on losing petitions
that asked for private relief, but the record is thin as to actual
cost procedures. Moreover, even today, the American rule has
many exceptions that allow courts to penalize losing parties,
including plaintiffs, with fee awards.294
The policy arguments are mixed as to whether the core right
should be limited to winning claims, but I contend that the
balance of the arguments supports the narrow definition.
Without question, losing but meritorious suits serve at least
some of the policies underlying the right to petition. Meritorious
suits, even if they are not ultimately successful, have social
value. By providing a neutral body, the courts give a peaceful
alternative for resolving disputes. Lawsuits that present
reasonable legal arguments advance development of the law,
even if they do not succeed. That reasonable but losing suits have
social value, however, does not answer whether such suits should
be within the core right to petition courts. To illustrate this point,
I turn to the Court's treatment of false speech.
In the New York Times line of cases, the Court did not hold
that false speech has no value at all. The ability to speak freely,
even to utter false statements, has some social value. If the speaker
is unencumbered, he can more fully participate in debate, and such
debate is a peaceful alternative to more forceful methods by which
the speaker might express himself, even if his intent is to utter
falsehoods.29 Instead, the Court in Gertz held that false speech has
29 because its harm outweighs its benefits:
no "constitutional value""
granted that it could be recovered from a losing party.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
293.
See A Speciall Court Held at Hartford, August 29, 1689, reprinted in 3 THE
PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT 246 (1968) (setting out procedures for
petitioners against other individuals, including service and, "if upon the tryall of the
cause it doth appear that either the petitioners or the person or persons cited doe or have
given the other any unjust trouble, the party wronged shall be allowed his just cost and
damages
as in other cases"),
available at http://www.colonialct.uconn.edu/
ViewPageByPageNew.cfm?v=3&p=246&c=4 (last visited Jan. 17, 2003).
294.
See generally Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 24762 (1975) (surveying the history of federal cost and fee statutes). Today, a number of
doctrines and statutes allow the assessment of attorneys' fees against the losing party.
See id. at 257-69. See generally John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee
Allocation: The Injured Person'sAccess to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1570-90 (1993)
(summarizing the common law exceptions and the more than two thousand state and two
hundred federal statutes shifting attorneys' fees). American courts also regularly make a
losing plaintiff pay at least some of the defendant's other expenses. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C.
§ 1920 (2000) (providing that "[a] judge or clerk or any court of the United States may tax
as costs" certain listed items, such as marshal and clerk fees, court reporter fees, printing
costs, and witness fees).
295.
See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
296.
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (stating that "there is
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Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially
advances society's interest in uninhibited, robust, and wideopen debate on public issues. They belong to that category
of utterances which "are no essential part of any exposition
of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed
by the social interest in order and
2 97
morality. ,
Thus, whether a particular activity falls within the core First
Amendment right turns on a balancing of the activity's benefits
against its detriments.
The social value arguments regarding reasonable but losing
suits mirror those regarding false speech, but, admittedly, the
analogy between losing suits and false speech is not perfect.
Losing but meritorious suits have more value than false speech.
The filing of a meritorious suit is more likely to advance law and
promote positive change than the utterance of false speech.
Moreover, a speaker is in greater control of the falsity of his
speech than a plaintiff is with regard to the outcome of his suit.
Assuming that a lawsuit is not grossly or intentionally frivolous,
a plaintiff does not necessarily know whether his claim is
deserving of redress. The outcome depends not only on the truth
of the facts, but also on a number of other factors such as the
passage of time, the relative ability of the lawyers, the status of
the law, the competence of the judge, and the make-up of the
jury.
Yet, on the other side of the scale, lawsuits impose greater
burdens than speech. The filing of any civil suit imposes burdens
on both the government and the defendant. One might be able to
ignore false speech, but neither the government nor the
defendant can ignore a lawsuit. Both must devote substantial
resources in response to a civil suit. Furthermore, unlike the
marketplace of ideas, judicial access is a limited resource. For
every lawsuit that is filed and lost, governmental resources are
diverted from processing winning claims. Thus, one could argue
that although the factors are different in considering false speech
and losing suits, the balance comes out the same way: there is

no constitutional value in false statements of fact").
297.
Id. (quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)). In Chaplinsky, the Court held that a New
Hampshire statute may properly outlaw epithets that are likely to provoke the average
person to retaliation and that "[rlesort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper
sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution."
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572-74.
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not sufficient constitutional value in losing but reasonable suits
to include them in the core First Amendment right.
This result is more compelling when considered in light of
the practical and policy implications of narrowly defining the core
right to include only winning claims, as opposed to a broader
definition. The principal implication of the definition is the level
of protection given to the suits at issue. To illustrate this
implication, I again use the example of false speech. Under New
York Times, false speech gets less protection than true speechregulation of false speech is tested under breathing room
analysis rather than the strict scrutiny applicable to true speech
(the core right) 9 8
Breathing room analysis is a form of balancing, as was the
initial determination of whether false speech had constitutional
value, but the focus of the two balancing tests is different. Under
the breathing room balancing test, the question is not whether
the harms of false speech outweigh the benefits of false speech,
but instead whether the regulation of false speech unduly chills
the expression of true speech. 9 The analysis focuses the
protection on the speech that really matters-true speech.
Likewise, narrow definition of the core right to petition
courts would focus First Amendment protection on the suits that
matter most, winning claims. Winning claims serve all of the
social value of reasonable but unsuccessful suits, and more.
Winning claims do not state merely plausible theories, they state
legal and factual arguments that actually deserve relief. As
recognized by the Court in Bill Johnson's, the First Amendment's
interests in civil suits include "compensation for violated
rights[,] ... psychological benefits of vindication, [and] public
airing of disputed facts." 00 Losing suits might air disputed facts
or advance the law, but winning suits alone serve the additional
aims of compensation and vindication. In other words, by serving
all of the policy aims of the Petition Clause, winning suits are the
core of the First Amendment right and should be protected by
strict scrutiny, as is true speech.
Similarly, as under New York Times, narrow definition of
the right of court access would not leave losing suits completely
unprotected. Instead, the courts would apply breathing room
analysis to determine whether a particular restriction on filing a
298.
Refer to notes 266-71 supra and accompanying text.
299.
Refer to notes 270-71 supra and accompanying text (describing the balancing
involved with breathing space analysis).
300.
Bill Johnson's Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 418 U.S. 731, 743 (1983) (quoting Balmer,
supra note 67, at 60).
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losing suit would unduly chill a plaintiffs ability to file a winning
claim. As I have argued before, many government restrictions
would fail breathing room analysis, for some of the same policy
reasons that distinguish losing but reasonable claims from false
speech.3"' The fact that a plaintiff cannot easily determine
whether his claim will win or lose in court is a significant factor
in the evaluation of chilling effect. For example, a court rule that
purported to allow a plaintiff to file only winning claims would
create an undue chilling effect on the ability to file winning
claims, precisely because the plaintiff cannot make this
determination before he files suit. Such a restriction, in most
cases, would fail First Amendment breathing room analysis.0 2
Most motive restrictions on filing reasonable but losing
claims would fail breathing room analysis for the same reason.
Assume for illustration purposes a court rule that bars a person
from filing suit for "any improper purpose." Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11(b)(1) is an example of such a rule.0 3 Even if such a
rule were read to apply to only completed and unsuccessful
claims, the rule still would chill the filing of winning claims.
Because the plaintiff cannot determine in advance whether his
claim will prevail, his only decision criteria is whether his
purpose is proper. The vague prohibition on "improper" purpose
further compounds his difficulty in deciding whether he may
bring his claim. If the potential plaintiff concludes that he has an
improper purpose within the meaning of the law and he wants to
comply with the law, his only choice is to not file suit even
though his claim might prevail. Thus, the motive restriction,
even if limited to punish only losing claims, has a chilling effect
on the filing of winning claims.
301.
See generally Andrews, Rules of Professional Conduct, supra note 7, at 13-29,
56-65 (assessing the rules of professional conduct for lawyers that might run afoul of the
First Amendment right to petition courts); Andrews, Motive Restrictions, supra note 7, at
695-738 (addressing a range of laws that purport to limit court access based on the
motive of the plaintiff).
302.
By contrast, a rule that required a plaintiff to pre-certify that her complaint
states objectively reasonable claims likely would pass breathing room analysis because
the plaintiff can employ some standards to determine whether the claim is reasonable.
Such a requirement might deter an overly cautious plaintiff from filing even a winning
claim, but the chilling effect is far less. See Andrews, Motive Restrictions, supra note 7, at
787 (arguing that a prefiling standard of merit might deter some plaintiffs from filing a
winning suit, but not nearly to the degree of a winning claim certification, and winning
claim certification would not be allowed by the First Amendment).
303.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b). This rule requires plaintiffs to certify, among other
things, that they have not filed the complaint for "any improper purpose." Id. I have
argued that Rule 11(b)(1) violates the Petition Clause in many of its applications. See
Andrews, PoliticallyMotivated Suits, supra note 7, at 48 (concluding that "any use of Rule
11(b)(1) to sanction or deter [Paula] Jones from filing her claims, based solely on her
motive, would have violated her rights under the First Amendment").
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Whether this effect is undue depends on a balancing of the
governmental interests behind the rule and the First
Amendment interests at stake. The governmental purpose
behind the "improper purpose" court rule is ambiguous, and that
ambiguity itself undermines the strength of the government's
interest."°4 One aim likely is to deter frivolous suits, because
many frivolous suits are filed for improper purposes. But a ban
on frivolous claims by itself would achieve this purpose, so the
question is what additional interest a ban on improper motive
might serve. The government may have some interest in keeping
the motives of its litigants "proper"-so that its court system will
not be used as a weapon in personal battles or vendettas-but
such a purpose would intrude significantly into First Amendment
freedoms. Because most litigants, even those with winning
claims, have some ill motives, a ban on improper purpose would
chill the filing of even the most meritorious claims. Thus, on
balance, the chilling effect of such a court rule would be undue
and would not survive breathing room analysis.
However, as the Court recognized in Gertz, the need for
breathing room may decrease as the governmental interest
changes. In the .above example of the court rule, the
governmental interest was a general one regarding
administration of the courts. Laws such as the civil rights
statutes have a more specific and compelling purpose-to prevent
the personal and societal harms of discrimination. The civil
rights laws, as currently worded, are broad enough to potentially
apply to and penalize a plaintiff who files suit for a
discriminatory purpose."°5 In such a case, the plaintiff would be
using the courts not only to advance a personal vendetta but also
to inflict harm, based solely on the defendant's race, disability, or
other special status. This abuses the court system in a unique
way. Although the formation of courts may be premised in part
on hostility between the parties-to provide a peaceful
alternative for resolution of dispute-courts were not created to
assist persons in promoting racial or other wrongful
discrimination.
Thus, as I have argued before, a court might be able to
assess compensatory damages under the Fair Housing Act
against a neighbor who, for a discriminatory purpose, filed and
304.
I explore this ambiguity and the potential governmental purposes behind the
federal "improper purpose" rule, Federal Rule 11(b)(1), in Andrews, Politically Motivated
Suits, supra note 7, at 85-90.
305.
Refer to note 103 supra and accompanying text (quoting pertinent excerpts of
the federal Fair Housing Act). See also Andrews, Motive Restrictions, supra note 7, at
739-40 (discussing the potential application of civil rights laws to punish civil suits).
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3 6
lost an objectively reasonable suit against his neighbor°.
To be
sure, the mere possibility of these damages would chill the filing
of winning claims for the same reasons that the court rule would
do so. The chilling effect would be somewhat less because the
civil rights laws prohibit a narrow category of motives that a
plaintiff can more easily identify than the broad "improper
purpose" of the court rule. Nevertheless, because the plaintiff
cannot know in advance if he will prevail, the civil rights laws
would chill some winning claims. °7 In this rare case, however,
the chilling effect may be justified. Society may want this
plaintiff in particular to stop, think, and refrain, and the First
Amendment may allow this limited effect. In other words, the
chilling effect may not be undue in light of the important
governmental interests in both eliminating the harms resulting
from insidious discrimination and preventing the courts from
becoming a tool in inflicting those harms.
Change the burden, however, and the result of the balancing
test necessarily varies. Even civil rights laws with important
interests cannot unduly chill the core right. Breathing room
analysis probably would not allow a court in a Fair Housing Act
challenge to enjoin a reasonable suit before its completion or to
impose punitive damages, because such measures would produce
too great a chilling effect on the filing of winning suits. Similarly,
under the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, Congress may
need to revise the civil rights laws so that they are explicit in
their regulation of civil suits.
The foregoing discussion assumes that laws, even the civil
rights statutes, could not punish suits within the core right
because this application could not pass strict scrutiny. The
Supreme Court for the most part has not permitted the civil
rights laws, no matter how high their aims, to penalize the
exercise of core First Amendment freedoms. This is not an easy
area of the law to decipher, for the Court only loosely applies
strict scrutiny criteria. °8 Instead, the Court seems to have

306.
Andrews, Motive Restrictions,supranote 7, at 790-91.
307.
Id. at 786-87.
308.
For example, where the Court has invalidated civil rights laws in a First
Amendment challenge, it is difficult to discern whether the Court is holding that the
purpose behind the law is not sufficiently compelling or whether the law is not narrowly
tailored to meet that aim. The Court, however, continues to cite strict scrutiny standards.
Refer to note 317 infra (discussing the Boy Scouts case and the Court's reference to strict
scrutiny); see also Andrews, Motive Restrictions, supra note 7, at 778-82 (discussing the
Court's application of strict scrutiny to civil rights laws). The Court's cases under New
York Times likewise provide little guidance because the Court's focus in those cases is on
breathing room analysis of restrictions on periphery activity, not strict scrutiny of laws
concerning core First Amendment activity. Refer to note 265 supra (discussing the Court's
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adopted a substantial intrusion test, under which the Court
examines the degree to which the civil rights law intrudes on
core First Amendment freedoms. If the intrusion into the core
activity is substantial, then the civil rights laws, no matter their
compelling purpose, violate the First Amendment.
The Court's substantial intrusion analysis is illustrated by
Roberts v. United States Jaycees. °9 In Roberts, the Court
considered whether application of Minnesota's civil rights statute
to compel the Jaycees to accept women violated the Jaycees's
First Amendment right of association.3 ° The Court answered no,
because this application of the civil rights law did not
substantially intrude on core First Amendment freedoms.3 ' The
Court explained that Minnesota's interest in eradicating sexual
discrimination "plainly serves compelling state interests of the
highest order"31 and that the law, as applied to the Jaycees, did
not impose "any serious burdens on the male members' freedom
of expressive association., 31 3 Yet the Court also noted that the

civil rights laws could not be applied to limit other, more
fundamental and intimate associational choices, such as one's
spouse.1 4 In other words, the core associational right extends to
intimate

associations

and

expressive

associations. 3"' Any

substantial intrusion by the government into these core
associations violates the First Amendment, even if the
government's purpose is to eradicate discrimination. Accordingly,
use of breathing room analysis in the cases following the decision in New York Times).
309.
468 U.S. 609 (1984).
310.
See id.
311.
Id. at 623-24.
312.
Id.
313.
Id. at 626.
314.
Id. at 620 (noting that "the Constitution undoubtedly imposes constraints on the
State's power to control the selection of one's spouse that would not apply to regulations
affecting the choice of one's fellow employees").
315.
Id. at 617-18. The Court explained the importance of these core associational
rights:
Our decisions have referred to constitutionally protected "freedom of association"
in two distinct senses. In one line of decisions, the Court has concluded that
choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships must be
secured against undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such
relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our
constitutional scheme. In this respect, freedom of association receives protection
as a fundamental element of personal liberty. In another set of decisions, the
Court has recognized a right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those
activities protected by the First Amendment-speech, assembly, petition for
redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion. The Constitution guarantees
freedom of association of this kind as an indispensable means of preserving other
individual liberties.
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the Court subsequently has held that the First Amendment does
not permit states to compel parade organizers to include a gay
and lesbian group,316 and it does not allow states to force the Boy
Scouts to admit gay scout masters.317
The Court has applied similar limits on the civil rights laws
in other First Amendment contexts. For example, the Court has
allowed a civil rights law to ban a discriminatory job
advertisement because the advertisement was commercial speech
that concerned wrongful activity and was not an expressive
advertisement such as that at issue in New York Times.1 8 In
other words, the advertisement did not contain speech at the
heart of the First Amendment speech right. The Court also has
permitted civil rights laws to enhance the penalty for crimes,
such as battery, that are motivated by racial hatred because the
underlying conduct-battery-is not speech. 319 But the Court has

not allowed civil rights laws to punish "hate speech" for its racial
316.
See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 572-73
(1995) (holding that a Massachusetts civil rights law, which protected citizens from
discrimination based on sexual orientation, could not be applied to force inclusion of a gay
group in a parade because such application would violate the parade organizer's First
Amendment rights of association and expression).
317.
See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 659 (2000). After finding that the
Boy Scouts was an expressive association, the Court examined whether the state law
could regulate that association. Id. at 656. The Court noted some confusion in its cases
assessing civil rights laws under the First Amendment right to association, but it
reaffirmed a form of strict scrutiny. Id. at 648 (citing Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609, 623 (1984)). This form of strict scrutiny was applied as a question of whether the
state law placed a "severe intrusion" on the organization's expressive activity. Id. at 659
(citing Hurley, 515 U.S. at 580-81). The Court concluded that the New Jersey law
constituted an impermissible intrusion on this core right. Id. "The state interests
embodied in New Jersey's public accommodations law do not justify such a severe
intrusion on the Boy Scouts' rights to freedom of expressive association." Id.
318.
See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376 (1973). In Pittsburgh Press, a city ordinance outlawed sex-designated employment
advertisements. Id. The Court noted that unlike the political advertisement in New York
Times, the job advertisements at issue did not take a "position on whether, as a matter of
social policy, certain positions ought to be filled by members of one or the other sex" and
did not criticize the ordinance or the city's practice of enforcing the law. Id. at 385.
Instead, the newspaper classified its help-wanted listings by sexual preference, such as
"Male Help Wanted." Id. at 379-80. According to the Court, the advertisements were
commercial activity, which gets less protection under the First Amendment than other
forms of speech. Id. at 387-88. Moreover, the speech at issue merited even less protection
because it stated in essence that the employer would engage in unlawful hiring practices,
just as if the advertisement proposed a sale of illegal drugs or prostitution. Id. at 388-89.
Thus, any First Amendment interest in protecting the commercial speech was "altogether
absent when the commercial activity itself is illegal and the restriction on advertising is
incidental to a valid limitation on economic activity." Id. at 389.
319.
See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 489-90 (1993) (holding that Wisconsin
could enhance a penalty based on racial motive and could prove that motive through
evidence of protected First Amendment activity, if the underlying conduct itself, such as
battery, was not protected by the First Amendment).
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content.32 ° The civil rights laws, no matter how compelling their
purpose, cannot intrude on core First Amendment rights.
Thus, the definition of the core right to petition courts is
crucial, for it determines the point at which a law's intrusion into
a First Amendment freedom becomes "substantial." By analogy
to the association cases, it is the equivalent of holding that
expressive and intimate associations are at the heart of the First
Amendment right of association. Thus, with respect to the right
to petition, if the core right were to include reasonable but losing
suits, the civil rights laws could not punish plaintiffs who
brought such suits, even for a racially discriminatory purpose. If
the core right were narrow and included only winning claims, the
courts could not punish plaintiffs who won their suits, no matter
their discriminatory purpose, but the courts might exact limited
penalties, under appropriately drafted civil rights laws, against
all other claims filed for discriminatory purposes.
Finally, by advocating a narrow definition of the core right, I
am not arguing for the reversal of Professional Real Estate
Investors or the cases that applied its objective standard in other
contexts. It may be good public policy to grant greater protection
to civil suits than that required by the First Amendment.
Moreover, in many contexts, the added protection of the objective
merit standard may be mandated by First Amendment breathing
room analysis.321 The question would be whether the
governmental interest behind the other laws, whether antitrust
statutes or state tort laws, is sufficient to justify their potential
chilling effect. As I argue above, motive restrictions rarely would
survive this test, but the validity of each law imposing motive
restrictions on filing suit remains an open question until a court
properly balances the competing interests and policies.
In sum, the definition of the core right to petition courts is
indeed a "difficult constitutional question." It is a question that I
believe must be answered narrowly. I recognize that my
arguments as to practical results hint at an "ends justify the
means" argument, but the practical implications of any ruling,
especially constitutional rulings, should not be ignored.

320.
See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392-94 (1992) (finding that a St.
Paul ordinance prohibiting messages based on "bias motivated hatred" and "Virulent
notions of racial supremacy" constituted an improper content and viewpoint regulation of
speech in violation of the First Amendment).
321.
As Justice O'Connor noted in BE & K, the Professional Real Estate Investors
standard gives litigation some breathing room by penalizing only those suits that were
filed for an anticompetitive purpose. Refer to notes 205-09 supra and accompanying text.
In other words, the standard protects some baseless suits from liability-baseless suits
filed for purposes other than anticompetitive intent.
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Moreover, I do not offer these arguments in isolation. I consider
the textual, historical and other policy arguments, and they do
not unequivocally point in one direction. Thus, the practical
implications tip the scale and argue for a narrow definition of the
core right to include only winning claims. For only through this
definition can the courts retain some flexibility, albeit a very
limited flexibility, to address and curb extreme cases of abuse.
C. The Implicationsof BE & K
Finally, I address how, if at all, the BE & K decision impacts
my proposal. I believe not only that the Court's opinions in BE &
K are consistent with my proposed framework but also that
adoption of my proposal is the best way in which the Court can
address most of its stated concerns. My analysis likely will not
please all nine Justices (or the legal academic community), but
no single system likely could achieve such unanimity. I fully
recognize that my argument that the right includes only winning
claims is neither initially appealing nor endorsed by the Court in
BE & K. Yet, upon closer examination of the Court's opinions, my
proposal fits remarkably well.
First, the majority suggested that motive alone does not
define the petition right. In other words, the fact that a plaintiff
has a bad motive by itself does not mean that he is not
petitioning for redress within the meaning of the Petition Clause.
This is an important issue, for if motive alone could serve as the
basis for liability, the definition of the proper merit standard
would be less important when evaluating laws that impose a
motive limitation, such as the NLRA and antitrust statutes. The
role of motive is a continuing concern of the Court with regard to
First Amendment rights. It was a central issue in Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell.22 In Hustler, the Court considered
whether Larry Flynt's intent to use his speech to inflict
emotional harm on Jerry Falwell could alone serve as a basis for
liability." 3 The Court held that the First Amendment prohibited
322.
485 U.S. 46 (1988).
323.
Id. at 50-51. Hustler magazine had published a cartoon parody suggesting that
Jerry Falwell had a drunken, incestuous relationship with his mother. Id. at 47-48.
Falwell did not prevail on his defamation claim because the jury found that the cartoon
could not be mistaken for fact. Id. at 48-49. The jury found, however, that the cartoon
caused Falwell emotional distress and awarded him more than $100,000 in damages. Id.
at 49. Intent was the essential prerequisite to liability under this tort, and Larry Flynt
admitted that he meant to harm Falwell. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, JERRY FALWELL V.
LARRY FLYNT: THE FIRST AMENDMENT ON TRIAL 59-60 (1988) (quoting deposition
testimony in which Flynt said that he wanted to "assassinate" Falwell through his
parody). In oral argument, the Court pondered whether intent alone could ever trigger
liability for speech. Id. at 268 (presenting excerpts of oral argument).
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this liability, but it limited its holding to the case before the
Court, which involved speech concerning a public figure.324 Thus,
Hustler left open whether bad motive in other cases could serve
as the sole basis for punishing exercise of First Amendment
freedoms.
The majority opinion in BE & K did not answer the question
either, but Justice O'Connor suggested that motive alone could
not serve as a basis for punishing civil suits. She cited Hustler as
"prohibiting use of ill motive to create liability for speech in the
realm of public debate about public figures."325 Importantly,
Justice O'Connor added:
[I]ll will is not uncommon in litigation. Cf. ProfessionalReal
Estate Investors, 508 U.S., at 69 (Stevens, J., concurring in
judgment) ("We may presume that every litigant intends
harm to his adversary"). Disputes between adverse parties
may generate such ill will that recourse to the courts
becomes the only legal and practical means to resolve the
situation.326

These two factors-the Court's reluctance to limit First
Amendment rights based on bad motive and the frequency of ill
motives in litigation-were the factors that Justice O'Connor
claimed did not "ease" the constitutional question before the
Court. 27 Yet, had motive been a proper basis on which to attach
liability for civil suits, the question would have been easier. In
other words, if the Court wanted an easier constitutional
question, it simply could have held that motive alone is a proper
basis for punishing civil suits. To be sure, the Court's decision
relied primarily on the fact that the NLRB punished some
litigation filed for a genuine purpose, but the Court's struggle to
define and redefine the constitutional question and its general
discussion of motive strongly suggest that the Court will not
allow lawsuits to be punished based solely on motive, regardless
of their merit.
By suggesting that motive does not define the right to
petition courts, the Court placed greater importance on the merit
standard. Although the Court did not decide the question of
merit under the First Amendment, I contend that my proposed
approach to defining the core right is reflected by the majority
324.
Hustler, 485 U.S. at 53 ("[W]hile such a bad motive may be deemed controlling
for purposes of tort liability in other areas of the law, we think the First Amendment

prohibits such a result in the area of public debate about public figures.").
325.
BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 122 S. Ct. 2390, 2401 (2002) (citing Hustler, 485
U.S. at 53).
326.
Id. at 2400-01 (parallel citation omitted).
327.
Id. Refer to notes 215-26 supra and accompanying text.
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opinion. The Court cited its breathing room jurisprudence and
struggled with defining the right under the Petition Clause, just
as my approach proposes. Admittedly, by listing the three
considerations, Justice O'Connor strongly suggested that the
Petition Clause should protect losing but reasonable suits. 328 I do
not disagree with this suggestion. In many instances, the First
Amendment should protect the right to file such suits. That
protection, however, should come from breathing room analysis.
Nothing in the majority opinion forecloses this result.
Importantly, the majority opinion expressly referred to the
breathing room doctrine and thereby suggested its approval of
this general approach to test and protect civil lawsuits under the
First Amendment. This is a significant suggestion, for this form
of analysis was by no means clear before BE & K. I previously
had argued for such an approach, but the Court never expressly
applied it to judicial petitions. As I note above, the Court had
suggested breathing room analysis in Bill Johnson's, but it did
not formally adopt it as an analytical framework.32 9 The Court did
not do so in BE & K either, but its citation to breathing room
cases, and not to other modern approaches to speech cases,3 3 0
suggests that the Court finds breathing room analysis
appropriate.
The question instead seems to be where the majority might
draw the line for application of breathing room doctrine. That is
the issue to which Justice O'Connor addressed her "three
considerations."33 ' To be sure, all three considerations argue for
protection of losing but reasonable suits, but they do not
necessarily argue for absolute protection as a core First
Amendment right. One could interpret Justice O'Connor's litany
of considerations as listing the arguments or factors that should
be considered in making the decision as to breadth of the core
right. Indeed, in my first article, I listed many of these concerns
328.
Refer to notes 208-15 supra and accompanying text.
329.
Refer to text accompanying notes 279-80 supra.
330.
For example, in an earlier article I considered whether the Court's decision in
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), where the Court applied strict scrutiny to a
hate speech ordinance, changed the form of analysis and outcome. See Andrews, Motive
Restrictions, supra note 7, at 747-51, 758-60. I concluded that the R.A.V. analysis likely
would reach the same result as under the breathing room doctrine. Id. Justice Breyer has
suggested another form of balancing interests in recent speech cases. See Turner Broad.
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 225-29 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring in part) (requiring
.a reviewing court to determine both whether there are significantly less restrictive ways
to achieve Congress'. . .programming objectives, and also to decide whether the statute..
. strikes a reasonable balance between potentially speech-restricting and speechenhancing consequences"); see also Andrews, Motive Restriction, supra note 7, at 749-50
(discussing Justice Breyer's approach). Neither new approach was suggested in BE & K.
331.
Refer to notes 208-15 supra and accompanying text.
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in weighing the same issue-whether losing and reasonable suits
are within the core right and absolutely protected or on the
periphery and protected by breathing room doctrine. And, it was
to this weighing of arguments that Justice O'Connor cited my
article.3 32 Finally, the majority never decided the issue."' It
merely stated the issue and arguments, as I had done in my
article. The Court is free in the future to draw the line on either
side.
The Court's reservation of open questions is particularly
telling as to the approach it will take in future cases. The
majority stated that it was not deciding whether the NLRB could
sanction losing but reasonable suits (if filed for a truly retaliatory
purpose) and not invalidating other litigation sanctions, such as
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and fee-shifting statutes. This
of course follows from the Court's narrow ground of decision. The
Court in the future could reach any number of conclusions on
these issues. Yet the fact that the Court expressly limited its
holding to not reach these other restrictions suggests, at a
minimum, that the Court wants to be cautious with regard to
these laws. Breathing room analysis is a far more cautious
approach than a broad reading of the core right. Thus, not only is
the majority opinion sufficiently open to allow future application
of my proposed definition and analysis, but my proposed
framework also would better serve the Court's desire to
cautiously apply the petition right to other litigation sanctions.
In contrast to the majority opinion, which strived to leave
open as many issues as possible, the concurring opinions of
Justice Breyer and Justice Scalia took a position. I contend that
although the two opinions advocated for different end results,
both reflect concerns that require a breathing room approach.
Justice Breyer clearly stated his view that the NLRB should be
able to continue its practice of punishing losing suits, if filed for a
truly retaliatory purpose. He can achieve this result, if at all,
only if the Court adopts the narrow definition of the right to
petition courts. For if the Court adopted the broader definition
and included losing but reasonable claims within the core right,
the NLRB penalty would be subject to strict scrutiny. This
application of the NLRA likely would fail strict scrutiny for the

332.
Refer to note 214 supra and accompanying text.
333.
See BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 122 S. Ct. 2390, 2402 (2002) ("[W]e do not
decide whether the Board may declare unlawful any unsuccessful but reasonably based
suits .... ).
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same reasons the civil rights laws, which have an equal or more
compelling purpose than the NLRA, would fail.334
If the Court adopted the more narrow definition of the core
right, Justice Breyer would have at least an opening, under
breathing room analysis, to make his policy arguments. This is
not to say that he would prevail. In my previous articles, I have
suggested that some laws, such as the civil rights statutes, would
survive breathing room analysis. Following the lead of the Bill
Johnson's win-lose test, I even suggested that the NLRA could be
read to allow damages as to completed suits that were reasonable
but unsuccessful.335 However, as I next discuss, Justice Scalia
raised a breathing room concern that I had not previously
considered, which may tip the balance in a breathing room
analysis and argue against allowing the NLRB to impose
damages for such retaliatory suits. At a minimum, the NLRA
likely would need revision so that it expressly addresses lawful
and unlawful suits, in order for the NLRA to satisfy the
3
vagueness and overbreadth doctrines."
In any event, Justice
Breyer would need to embrace my proposed approach, as opposed
to the broader definition of the core right, in order to have the
best opportunity to make his policy arguments for permitting
NLRA penalties.
By contrast, Justice Scalia suggested the opposite result. He
seemingly would endorse a future holding under which the Court
would limit the NLRB's ability to punish employer suits. He
would hold that the NLRB could punish only those suits that are
both objectively unreasonable and filed for a true improper
purpose. This future holding could be a matter of restrictive
statutory policy, as was Professional Real Estate Investors, but
Justice Scalia suggested a First Amendment dimension to the
problem.337 This suggestion might reflect his view that the core
right includes losing but meritorious suits, but I believe that the
better interpretation is that Justice Scalia's First Amendment
concerns arise out of breathing room doctrine.
Justice Scalia's chief concern with NLRB punishment of
losing but reasonable suits was that a federal agency, rather
than an Article III court, makes the factual finding as to
motive. 38 Justice Scalia's concern, mirrors that in Bose Corp. v.
334.
335.
potential
11(b)(1)).
336.
337.
338.

Refer to notes 308-20 supra (discussing strict scrutiny of civil rights laws).
See Andrews, Politically Motivated Suits, supra note 7, at 95-96 (contrasting
breathing room analysis of the NLRA to that of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
Refer to notes 274-75 supra (defining the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines).
Refer to notes 250-55 supra, 339-41 infra and accompanying text.
See BE & K, 122 S. Ct. at 2403 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Consumers Union of United States, Inc."' In Bose, the Court
reaffirmed that appellate courts must conduct a de novo review of
the "constitutional facts" necessary for finding liability under the
New York Times actual malice standard.34 ° This is a form of
breathing room. In order to ensure the protection of the actual
malice standard, the appellate courts under Bose must
independently review the factual basis for any finding of actual
malice, which adds another layer of breathing room. The analogy
is not perfect. Bose imposed de novo appellate court review of a
jury's finding of fact. Justice Scalia instead was concerned about
findings made by a federal agency. Yet, he echoed the concerns of
Bose when he said that a "difficult question under the First
Amendment" was presented by an executive agency punishing a
reasonably based suit filed in federal court whenever the agency
"concludes-insulated from de novo judicial review" that the
plaintiff had a particular motive. 4 '
That Justice Scalia was raising a breathing room issue is
further reflected by the fact that his concerns did not extend to
other findings made by the NLRB. Justice Scalia seemingly
would allow the NLRB to make findings as to motive when the
underlying suit was objectively baseless. This reflects the
flexibility of breathing room analysis where the level of
protection depends on the burdens and the relative governmental
and First Amendment interests. Independent judicial review
might be necessary under the breathing room doctrine when
punishing losing but reasonable suits, but not necessary when
punishing frivolous suits. The former involves greater First
Amendment interests and is much more likely to create a chilling
effect on winning suits than the latter.
Justice Scalia also suggested that a trial court could invoke
common litigation sanctions against litigants that appear before
339.
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
340.
Id. at 510-11. The Bose Court explained:
The requirement of independent appellate review reiterated in New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan is a rule of federal constitutional law. It emerged from the
exigency of deciding concrete cases; it is law in its purest form under our
common-law heritage. It-reflects a deeply held conviction that judges-and
particularly Members of this Court-must exercise such review in order to
preserve the precious liberties established and ordained by the Constitution. The
question whether the evidence in the record in a defamation case is of the
convincing clarity required to strip the utterance of First Amendment protection
is not merely a question for the trier of fact. Judges, as expositors of the
Constitution, must independently decide whether the evidence in the record is
sufficient to cross the constitutional threshold that bars the entry of any
judgment that not supported by clear and convincing proof of "actual malice."

Id.
341.

BE & K, 122 S. Ct. at 2403 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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the court. 42 The ability to impose such litigation sanctions
depends first on what action the court is punishing. If the court is
addressing affirmative misconduct of a litigant or his attorney,
such as a misrepresentation or disobedience of a court order, the
court has the power to punish the behavior, without Petition
Clause problems, regardless of how the core right is defined.343
Justice Scalia more likely was referring to the question reserved
by the majority-the validity of fee-shifting statutes that impose
a fee award solely because the plaintiff lost his case. For this type
of statute, the definition of the core right is crucial. Courts, even
Article III federal courts, are not free to infringe First
Amendment freedoms. If the core right included losing but
reasonable claims, many fee-shifting statutes would be in
jeopardy under strict scrutiny analysis.
Take the example of an attorneys' fee award under a statute
that shifts fees based solely on whether the plaintiff prevailed (as
opposed to a statute such as the NLRA, which imposes additional
burdens and which bases the award on additional criteria such as
motive). At least one Justice in oral argument sought to
distinguish such an award as a common form of cost, as opposed
to punishment.344 Yet, a fee award is a form of compensatory
damages. Indeed, attorneys' fees are the primary damage
suffered when a defendant is harmed by a civil suit. New York
Times made clear that a compensatory damage award is a
government restriction that can run afoul of the First
Amendment just as a criminal penalty can. 345 The Court has not
342.
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring) (concluding that the majority was correct in not
questioning the "validity of common litigation sanctions imposed by courts themselves").
343.
This is in part because the core petition right protects only the right to file the
initial claim and not its later processing. Refer to note 276 supra. Later procedures before
a court are protected by breathing room analysis, and such analysis would permit
punishment of affirmative misdeeds. Moreover, the Petition Clause likely would not
prohibit a court from punishing a plaintiff for making a misrepresentation in the initial
complaint itself because such misrepresentation seemingly would not be part of the core
right to present winning claims. See generally Andrews, PoliticallyMotivated Suits, supra
note 7, at 90-93 (concluding that "the balance of interests might allow a motive ban on
particular stages of the process because such a prohibition would have only a minor
chilling effect and serve both governmental and First Amendment interests").
344.
See Official Transcript, supra note 112, at *12 (noting that "one could easily say,
when you're exposed to treble damages, punitive damages, yes, that's a punishment....
fee-shifting is the rule in most countries in the world").
345.
See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964).
Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the Alabama courts
have applied a state rule of law which petitioners claim to impose invalid
restrictions on their constitutional freedoms of speech and press. It matters
not that the law has been applied in a civil action [for defamation] and that is
common law only ....
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yet allowed compensatory damage awards as to true speech. 46
Indeed, it only grudgingly allows compensatory damages as to
false speech.
To be sure, the government can impose some costs when the
the
freedoms burdens
of First Amendment
exercise
3 47 For this reason, courts in most cases can continue
government.
to require the plaintiff to pay a filing fee.348 Fee awards, however,
are a far more significant burden. Indeed, this potential burden
is precisely why Congress chooses to shift fees, so that it can

create either an incentive or disincentive to bring suit. 49 Thus,
absent any other litigation misconduct, fees should be awarded, if
at all, only against suits outside of the core right. If the core right
were defined to include losing but reasonable suits, losing
plaintiffs could not be burdened with fee awards unless they
presented frivolous claims. Any simple fee-shifting statute that
broadly applied to all losing plaintiffs would be unconstitutional.
By contrast, under my proposed framework, the
constitutional free zone would include only winning plaintiffs. In
other words, the Petition Clause would protect a winning
plaintiff from the burden of a fee award,3 "' but courts might be
able to impose fee awards against losing plaintiffs with
reasonable claims. The latter question would depend on
application of the breathing room doctrine. This is where the
difference between fee-shifting and other forms of punishment,
such as treble damages, comes into play. Because fee awards are
346.
Refer to note 265 supra (discussing the Court's treatment of true speech in the
defamation context).
Even in the case of protected speech, the Court allows the government to recoup
347.
some of its costs through permit or license fees, so long as those fees are not dependent on
content. See Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless v. City of Cleveland, 885 F. Supp.
1029, 1033-34 (N.D. Ohio 1995) (rejecting the argument that only nominal fees are
constitutional and allowing a $50 fee because it was "reasonably related to the expenses
incident to the administration of the ordinance and to the maintenance of public safety
and order"). See generally David Goldberger, A Reconsiderationof Cox v. New Hampshire:
Can DemonstratorsBe Required to Pay the Costs of Using American's Public Forums?, 62
TEX. L. REV. 403, 404-07 (1983).
See Andrews, Access to Court, supra note 7, at 679 n.418 (discussing filing fees).
348.
There may be some question as to the constitutionality of a filing fee under First
Amendment scrutiny when the plaintiff is indigent. See Note, A FirstAmendment Right of
Access to Court for Indigents, 82 YALE L.J. 1055, 1064-66 (1973) (arguing that filing fees
as assessed against indigent plaintiffs would not pass strict scrutiny).
See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 415-19 (1978)
349.
(summarizing the various congressional policies behind fee-shifting provisions in the civil
rights laws, including the "intent of Congress to cast a ... plaintiff in the role of a 'private
attorney general').
See In re Workers' Comp. Refund, 46 F.3d 813, 821-22 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding
350.
that a statute that required plaintiff to bear the defendant state's costs, win or lose, in
any suit challenging the refund statute violated the plaintiffs Petition Clause right of
court access).
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common and present somewhat lower burdens than other
punishments, some fee-shifting laws might pass breathing room
analysis, depending on the statute's purpose and its actual effect.
Not all fee awards would survive breathing room analysis, but
this approach at least allows a balancing of the relative interests.
Thus, Justice Scalia, like Justice Breyer, needs the freedom
afforded by my proposed framework. Both Justices want to
preserve the ability to punish some losing but reasonable suits.
They just disagree as to the appropriate cases for such penalty.
This is in essence a debate as to application of the various
breathing room doctrines, and this debate is possible only when
the core right is narrowly defined by whether the claim wins or
loses.
IV. CONCLUSION

In BE & K, the Court had an opportunity to resolve the
question of the proper merit standard under the Petition Clause.
It chose not to do so. However, this does not mean that the Court
left us without any clues as to the future case in which it will
decide the "difficult constitutional question." Although no
particular form of analysis is readily apparent from the three
opinions in BE & K, closer examination of the opinions suggests
that the Court may adopt my proposed framework, or one like it,
in which the Court will narrowly define the core right to include
only winning claims and broadly protect that right under
breathing room analysis. The majority opinion is deliberately
cautious and leaves this possibility open. Moreover, breathing
room analysis, as opposed to strict scrutiny, gives Justice Breyer
at least an opening to argue that labor law history and policy
support punishment of losing but reasonable suits. Likewise, it
also gives Justice Scalia a better opportunity to argue for
continued application of fee-shifting statutes against losing
plaintiffs.
More importantly, even without considering the Justices'
views in BE & K, narrow definition of the core right is the better
approach. The proposed framework would focus First
Amendment protection on the suits that matter most-winning
claims. This would not expose every losing plaintiff to
punishment and would not close courthouse doors to aggrieved
parties. Due to the unique nature of civil suits-principally the
fact that a plaintiff can never know whether his reasonable claim
will prevail-most restrictions on reasonable claims would fail
breathing room analysis. The First Amendment would permit
only rare punishment of losing but reasonable suits. The courts
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might be able to apply a civil rights law to assess damages
against a plaintiff who filed suit against his neighbor solely
because of racial hatred, but even this punishment probably
would be limited to clearly worded statutes that applied only
compensatory damages to completed and unsuccessful suits. The
virtue of the breathing room framework is that it is flexible
enough to allow such damages in extreme cases. It protects the
rights of most litigants to go to court with reasonable claims, and
at the same time, it also protects the courts against flagrant
cases of abuse.

